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When applied to a system, the doctrine of
successive refinement is a divide-and-
conquer strategy. Complex systems are suc-
cessively divided into pieces that are less
complex, until they are simple enough to be
conquered. This decomposition results in
several structures for describing the product
system and the producing system ("the
system that produces the system"). These
structures play important roles in systems
engineering and project management. Many
of the remaining sections in this chapter are
devoted to describing some of these key
structures.
Structures that describe the product sys-
tem include, but are not limited to, the re-
quirements tree, system architecture and
certain symbolic information such as system
drawings, schematics, and data bases. The
structures that describe the producing sys-
tem include the project's work breakdown,
schedules, cost accounts and organization.
These structures provide different perspec-
tives on their common raison d'etre: the
desired product system. Creating a funda-
mental harmony among these structures is
essential for successful systems engineering
and project management; this harmony
needs to be established in some cases by one-
to-one correspondence between two struc-
tures, and in other cases, by traceable links
across several structures. It is useful, at this
point, to give some illustrations of this key
principle.
System requirements serve two purposes
in the systems engineering process. First,
they represent a hierarchical description of
the buyer's desired product system as under-
stood by the systems engineer. The interac-
tion between the buyer and systems engineer
to develop these requirements is one way the
"voice of the buyer" is heard. Determining
the right requirements -- that is, only those
that the informed buyer is willing to pay for
is an important part of the systems engi-
neer's job. Second, system requirements also
communicate to the design engineers what to
design and build (or code). As these require-
ments are allocated, they become inexorably
linked to the system architecture and prod-
uct breakdown, which consists of the hierar-
chy of project, systems, segments, elements,
subsystems, etc.
The work breakdown structure (WBS) is
also a hierarchical structure that contains
the pieces of work necessary to complete the
project. Each task in the WBS should be
traceable to one or more of the system re-
quirements. Schedules, which are structured
as networks, describe the time-phased activi-
ties that result in the product system in the
WBS The cost account structure needs to be
directly linked to the work in WBS and the
schedules by which that work is done.
The project's organizational structure
describes clusters of personnel assigned to
perform the work. These organizational
structures are usually trees. Sometimes they
are represented as a matrix of two interlaced
trees; one for line responsibilities, the other
for project responsibilities. In any case, the
structure should allow identification of re-
sponsibility for each WBS task.
Project documentation is the product of
particular WBS tasks. There are two funda-
mental categories of project documentation:
baselines and archives. Each category con-
tains information about both the product
system and the producing system. The base-
line, once established, contains information
describing the current state of the product
system and producing system resulting from
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all decisions that have been made. It is usu-
ally organized as a collection of hierarchical
tree structures, and should exhibit a signifi-
cant amount of cross-linking. The archives
should contain all of the rest of the project's
information that is worth keeping, even if
only temporarily. The archives should con-
tain all assumptions, data and supporting
analyses that are relevant to past, present
and future decisions. Inevitably, the struc-
ture (and control) of the archives is much
looser than that of the baseline, though cross
references should be maintained where feasi-
ble.
The structure of reviews (and their asso-
ciated control gates) reflect the time-phased
activities associated with the realization of
the product system from its product break-
down. The status reporting and assessment
structure provides information on the
progress of those same activities. On the fi-
nancial side, the status reporting and assess-
ment structure should be directly linked to
the WBS, schedules and cost accounts. On
the technical side, it should be linked to the
product breakdown and/or the requirements
tree.
MANAGING THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
PROCESS: THE SYSTEMS
ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT PLAN
Systems engineering management is a tech-
nical function and discipline that ensures
that systems engineering and all other tech-
nical functions are properly applied.
Each project should be managed in accor-
dance with a project cycle that is carefully
tailored to the project's risks. While the pro-
ject manager concentrates on managing the
overall project cycle, the project-level or lead
systems engineer concentrates on managing
its technical aspect. This requires that the
systems engineer perform (or cause to be per-
formed) the necessary multiple layers of
decomposition, definition, integration, ver-
ification and validation of the system, while
orchestrating and incorporating the appro-
priate concurrent engineering. Each one of
these systems engineering functions re-
quires application of technical analysis skills
and tools to achieve the optimum system
solution.
The techniques used in systems engineer-
ing management include baseline manage-
ment, requirements traceability, change
control, design reviews, audits, document
control, failure review boards, control gates
and performance certification.
The Project Plan defines how the overall
project will be managed to achieve the pre-
established requirements within defined pro-
grammatic constraints. The Systems Engi-
neering Management Plan (SEMP) is the
subordinate document that defines to all
project participants how the project will be
technically managed within the constraints
established by the Project Plan. The SEMP
communicates to all participants how they
must respond to pre-established manage-
ment practices. For instance, the SEMP
should describe the means for both internal
and external (to the project) interface con-
trol.
Role of the SEMP
The SEMP is the rule book that describes to
all participants how the project will be tech-
nically managed. The responsible NASA
Center should have a SEMP to describe ho_"
it will conduct its technical management,
and each contractor should have a SEMP to
describe how it will manage in accordance
with both its contract and NASA's technical
management practices. Since the SEMP is
project: and contract-unique, it must be up-
dated for each significant programmatic
change or it will become outmoded and un-
used, and the project could slide into an un-
controlled state. The NASA Center should
have its SEMP developed before attempting
to prepare a "should-cost" estimate, since ac-
tivities that incur cost, such as technical risk
reduction, need to be identified and described
first. The contractor should have its SEMP
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developed during the proposal process (prior
to costing and pricing) because the SEMP de-
scribes the technical content of the project,
the potentially costly risk management ac-
tivities, and the verification and validation
techniques to be used, all of which must be
included in the preparation of project cost
estimates.
The project SEMP is the senior technical
management document for the project; all
other technical control documents, such as
the Interface Control Plan, Change Control
Plan, Make-or-Buy Control Plan, Design
Review Plan, Technical Audit Plan, etc., de-
pend on the SEMP and must comply with it.
The SEMP should be comprehensive and
describe how a fully integrated engineering
effort will be managed and conducted.
Contents of the SEMP
Since the SEMP describes the project's tech-
nical management approach, which is driven
by the type of project, the phase in the project
cycle, and the technical development risks, it
must be specifically written for each project
to address these situations and issues. While
the specific content of the SEMP is tailored
to the project, the recommended content is
listed below.
Part I -- Technical Program Planning
and Control. This section should identify
organizational responsibilities and authority
for systems engineering management, in-
clude control of contracted engineering; lev-
els of control established for performance
and design requirements, and the control
method used; technical progress assurance
methods; plans and schedules for design and
technical program reviews; and control of
documentation.
This section should describe:
• The role of the project office
• The role of the user
• The role of the Contracting Office Techni-
cal Representative (COTR)
• The role of systems engineering
• Therole of design engineering
• The role of specialty engineering
• Applicable standards
• Applicable procedures and training
• Baselinecontrolprocess
• Changecontrolprocess
• Interfacecontrolprocess
• Control of contracted (or subcontracted)
engineering
• Data control process
• Make-or-buy control process
• Parts, materials and process control
• Quality control
• Safety control
• Contamination control
• EMI/EMC
• Technical performance measurement
• Control gates
• Internal technical reviews
• Integration control
• Verification control
• Validation control.
Part II -- Systems Engineering Process.
This section should contain a detailed de-
scription of the process to be used, including
the specific tailoring of the process to the re-
quirements of the system and project; the
procedures to be used in implementing the
process; in-house documentation; the trade
study methodology; the types of mathemat-
ical and/or simulation models to be used for
system cost-effectiveness evaluations; and
the generation of specifications.
This section should describe the:
• System decomposition process
• System decomposition format
• System definition process
• System analysis and design process
• Trade study process
• System integration process
• System verification process
• System qualification process
• System acceptance process
• System validation process
• Risk management process
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. Life-cycle cost management process
• Use of mathematical models
• Use of simulations
• Specification and drawing structure
• Baseline management process
• Baseline communication process
• Change control process
• Tools to be used.
Part III -- Engineering Specialty Inte-
gration. This section of the SEMP should de-
scribe tbe integration and coordination of the
efforts of the specialty engineering disci-
plines into the systems engineering process
during each iteration of that process. Where
there is potential for overlap of specialty ef-
forts, the SEMP should define the relative
responsibilities and authorities of each.
This section should contain the project's
approach to:
• Concurrent engineering
• The activity phasing of specialty disci-
plines
• The participation of specialty disciplines
• The involvement of specialty disciplines
• The role and responsibility of specialty
disciplines
• The participation of specialty disciplines
in system decomposition and definition
• The role of specialty disciplines in verifi-
cation and validation
• Reliability
• Producibility
• Human engineering
• Maintainability
• Safety
• Survivability/vulnerability
• Integrated logistics
• Quality assurance.
Development of the SEMP
The SEMP must be developed concurrently
with the Project Plan. In developing the-
SEMP, the technical approach to the project,
and hence the technical aspect of the project
cycle, are developed. This becomes the keel of
the project that ultimately determines the
length and cost of the project. The develop-
ment of the programmatic and technical
management approaches of the project re-
quires that the key project personnel develop
an understanding of the work to be per-
formed and the relationships among the var-
ious parts of that work. (See sections on work
breakdown structures and network sched-
ules.)
SEMP Lessons Learned frorn DoD Experience
• A well-managed project requires a
coordinated SEMP that is used through
the project cycle.
• A SEMP is a living document that must be
updated as the project changes and kept
consistent with the Project Plan.
• A meaningful SEMP must be the product
of experts from all areas of the project.
• Projects with little or insufficient systems
engineering discipline generally have
major problems.
• Weak systems engineering, or systems
engineering placed too low in the
organization, cannot perform the functions
as required.
• The systems engineering effort must be
skillfully managed and well
communicated to all the individuals.
• The systems engineering effort must be
responsive to both the customer and the
contractor interests.
The SEMP's development requires contri-
butions from knowledgeable programmatic
and technical experts from all areas of the
project that can significantly influence the
project's outcome. The involvement of recog-
nized experts is needed to establish a SEMP
that is credible to the project manager and to
secure the full commitment of the project
team.
Managing the Systems Engineering
Process: Summary
Systems engineering organizations, and spe-
cifically project-level systems engineers, are
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responsible for managing projects through
the technical aspect of the project cycle. This
responsibility includes managing the decom-
position and definition sequence, managing
the integration, verification and validation
sequence and controlling the technical
baselines of the project. Typically, these
baselines are the functional, "design-to,"
"build-to" (or "code-to"), "as-built" (or "as-
coded"), and "as-deployed." Systems engi-
neering must ensure efficient and logical
progression through these baselines.
Systems engineering is responsible for
system decomposition and design until the
design-to specifications of all lower level con-
figuration items have been produced. Design
engineering is then responsible for develop-
ing the build-to and code-to documentation
that complies with the approved design-to
baseline. Systems engineering audits the
design and coding process and the design en-
gineering solutions for compliance to all
higher level baselines. In performing this
responsibility, systems engineering must
ensure requirements traceability and docu-
ment the results in a requirements traceabil-
ity/verification matrix.
Systems engineering is also responsible
for the overall management of the integra-
tion, verification and validation process. In
this role, systems engineering conducts Test
Readiness Reviews and ensures that only
verified configuration items are integrated
into the next higher assembly for further
verification. Verification is continued to the
system level, after which system validation
is conducted to prove compliance with user
requirements.
Systems engineering also ensures that
concurrent engineering is properly applied
through the project cycle by involving the
required specialty engineering. The SEMP is
the guiding document for these activities.
THE WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE
A WBS is a hierarchical breakdown of the
work necessary to complete a project. The
WBS should be a product-based, hierarchical
division of deliverable items and associated
services. As such, it should contain the pro-
ject's product breakdown structure (PBS),
with the specified prime product(s) at the
top, and the systems, segments, subsystems,
etc. at successive lower levels. At the lowest
level are products such as hardware items,
software items and information items (e.g.,
documents, databases, etc.) for which there
is a cognizant engineer or manager. Branch
points in the hierarchy should show how the
PBS elements are to be integrated. The WBS
is built from the PBS by adding, at each
branch point of the PBS, any necessary ser-
vice elements such as management, systems
engineering, integration and verification
(I&V), and integrated logistics support (ILS).
If several WBS elements require similar
equipment or software, then a higher level
WBS element might be defined to perform a
block buy or a development activity (e.g.,
"System Support Equipment"). Figure 1
shows the relationship between a system, a
PBS and a WBS.
A project WBS should be carried down to
the cost account level appropriate to the
risks to be managed. The appropriate level of
detail for a cost account is determined by
management's desire to have visibility into
costs, balanced against the cost of planning
and reporting. Contractors may have a Con-
tract WBS (CWBS), which is appropriate to
the contractor's needs to control costs. A
summary CWBS, consisting of the upper lev-
els of the full CWBS, is usually included in
the project WBS to report costs to the con-
tracting agency.
WBS elements should be identified by ti-
tle and by a numbering system that performs
the following functions:
• Identifies the level of the WBS element
• Identifies the higher level element into
which the WBS element will be integrat-
ed
• Shows the cost account number of the
element.
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Figure 1 The Relationship between a System,
a Product Breakdown Structure, and
a Work Breakdown Structure
A WBS should also have a companion WBS
dictionary that contains each element's title,
identification number, objective, description,
and any dependencies (e.g., receivables) on
other WBS elements. This dictionary pro-
vides a structured project description that is
valuable for orienting project members and
other interested parties. It fully describes
the products and/or services expected from
each WBS element.
This section provides some techniques for
developing a WBS, and points out some mis-
takes to avoid.
Role of the WBS
A product-based WBS is the organizing
structure for:
, Project and technical planning and sched-
uling
• Cost estimation and budget formuIation
(In particular, costs collected in a
product-based WBS can be compared to
historical data. This is identified as a
primary objective by DoD standards for
WBSs.)
• Defining the scope of statements of work
and specifications for contract efforts
• Project status reporting, including sched-
ule, cost and work force, technical perfor-
mance, integrated cost schedule data
(such as earned value and estimated cost
at completion)
• Plans, such as the SEMP, and other docu-
mentation products, such as specifica-
tions and drawings.
It provides a logical outline and vocabulary
that describes the entire project and inte-
grates information in a consistent way. If
there is a schedule slip in one element of a
WBS, an observer can determine which other
WBS elements are most likely to be affected.
Cost impacts are more accurately estimated.
If there is a design change in one element of
the WBS, an observer can determine which
other WBS elements will most likely be af-
fected, and these elements can be consulted
for potential adverse impacts.
Techniques for Developing the WBS
Developing a successful project WBS is likely
to require several iterations through the
project cycle since it is not always obvious at
[
r
z
4O
MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
the outset what the full extent of the work
may be. Prior to developing a preliminary
WBS, there should be some development of
the system architecture to the point where a
preliminary PBS can be created.
The PBS and associated WBS can then be
developed level by level from the top down.
In this approach, a project-level systems en-
gineer finalizes the PBS at the project level,
and provides a draft PBS for the next lower
level. The WBS is then derived by adding ap-
propriate services such as management and
systems engineering to that lower level. This
recursive process is repeated until a WBS ex-
ists down to the desired cost account level.
An alternative approach is to define all
levels of a complete PBS in one design activ-
ity, and then develop the complete WBS.
When this approach is taken, it is necessary
to take great care to develop the PBS so that
all products are included, and all assembly/
integration and verification branches are
correct. The involvement of people who will
be responsible for the lower level WBS ele-
ments is recommended.
A WBS for a Multiple Delivery Project.
Some of the terms for projects that provide
multiple deliveries, are "rapid develop-
ment," "rapid prototyping" and "incremental
delivery." Such projects should also have a
product-based WBS, but there will be one ex-
tra level in the WBS hierarchy immediately
under the final prime product(s) that identi-
fies each delivery. At any point in time there
will be both active and inactive elements in
the WBS.
A WBS for an Operational Facility. A
WBS for managing an operational facility
such as a flight operations center is analo-
gous to a WBS for developing a system. The
difference is that the products in the PBS are
not necessarily completed once and then
integrated, but are all produced on a routine
basis. A PBS for an operational facility
might consist of information products or
service products provided to external cus-
tomers. However, the general concept of a
hierarchical breakdown of products and/or
services would still apply.
The rules that apply to a development
WBS also apply to a WBS for an operational
facility. The techniques for developing a
WBS for an operational facility are the same,
except that services such as maintenance
and user support are added to the PBS, and
services such as systems engineering, inte-
gration and verification may not be needed.
Common Errors in Developing a WBS
There are three common errors found in
WBSs:
Error 1: The WBS describes functions,
not products. This makes the project man-
ager the only one formally responsible for
products.
Error 2: The WBS has branch points that
are not consistent with how the WBS ele-
ments will be integrated. For instance, in a
flight operations system with a distributed
architecture, there is typically software asso-
ciated with hardware items that will be inte-
grated and verified at lower levels of a WBS.
It would then be inappropriate to separate
hardware and software as if they were sepa-
rate systems to be integrated at the system
level. This would make it difficult to assign
accountability for integration and to identify
the costs of integrating and testing compo-
nents of a system.
Error 3: The WBS is inconsistent with
the PBS. This makes it possible that the PBS
will not be fully implemented, and generally
complicates the management process.
Some examples of these errors are shown
in Figure 2. Each one prevents the WBS from
successfully performing its roles in project
planning and organizing. These errors are
avoided by using the WBS development tech-
niques described above.
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_ Error I I Functions without Products
This WBS describes only
functions, not the products
Error 2 Inappropriate Branches
This WBS has branch points that are
not consistent with the way the WBS
elements will be integrated
I Error 3 ] Inconsistency with PBS
This WBS is inconsistent with the
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Figure 2 Examples of WBS Development Errors
NETWORK SCHEDULING
Products described in the WBS are the result
of activities that take time to complete. An
orderly and efficient systems engineering
process requires that these activities take
place in a way that respects the underlying
time-precedence relationships among them.
This is accomplished by creating a network
schedule, which explicitly takes into account
the dependencies of each activity on other ac-
tivities and receivables from outside sources.
This section discusses the role of scheduling
and the techniques for building a complete
network schedule.
Scheduling is an essential component of
planning and managing the activities of a
project. The process of creating a network
schedule can lead to a much better under-
standing of what needs to be done, how long
it will take, and how each element of the pro-
ject WBS might affect other elements. A
complete network schedule can be used to
calculate how long it will take to complete a
project, which activities determine that du-
ration (i.e., critical path activities), and how
much spare time (i.e., float) exists for all the
other activities of the project. An under-
standing of the project's schedule is a
prerequisite for accurate project budgeting.
Keeping track of schedule progress is an
essential part of controlling the project, be-
cause cost and technical problems often show
up first as schedule problems. Because net-
work schedules show how each activity af-
fects other activities, they are essential for
predicting the consequences of schedule slips
or accelerations of an activity on the entire
project. Network scheduling systems also
help managers accurately assess the impact
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Critical Path and Float Calculation
The critical path is the sequence of activities
that will take the longest to accomplish. Activi-
ties that are not on the critical path have a cer-
tain amount of time that they can be delayed un-
til they, too are on a critical path. This time is
called float. There are two types of float, path
float and free float. Path float is where a se-
quence of activities collectively have float. If
there is a delay in an activity in this sequence,
then the path float for all subsequent activities
is reduced by that amount. Free float exists
when a delay in an activity will have no effect on
any other activity. For example, if activity A can
be finished in 2 days, and activity B requires 5
days, and activity C requires completion of both
A and B, then A would have 3 days of free float.
Float is valuable. Path float should be con-
served where possible, so that a reserve exists
for future activities. Conservation is much less
important for free float.
To determine the critical path, there is first
a "forward pass" where the earliest start time of
each activity is calculated. The time when the
last activity can be completed becomes the end
point for that schedule. Then there is a "back-
ward pass," where the latest possible start point
of each activity is calculated, assuming that the
last activity ends at the end point previously cal-
culated. Float is the time difference between the
earliest start time and the latest start time of an
activity. Whenever this is zero, that activity is
on a critical path.
of both technical and resource changes on the
cost and schedule of a project.
Network Schedule Data and Graphical
Formats
Network schedule data consist of:
• Activities
• Dependencies between activities (e.g.,
where an activity depends upon another
activity for a receivable)
• Products or milestones that occur as a re-
sult of one or more activities
• Duration of each activity.
A work flow diagram (WFD) is a graphi-
cal display of the first three data items
above. A network schedule contains all four
data items. When creating a network sched-
ule, graphical formats of these data are very
useful. Two general types of graphical for-
mats, shown in Figure 3, are used. One has
activities-on-arrows, with products and de-
pendencies at the beginning and end of the
arrow. This is the typical format of the Pro-
gram Evaluation and Review Technique
(PERT) chart. The second called precedence
diagrams, has boxes that represent activi-
ties; dependencies are then shown by arrows.
Due to its simpler visual format and reduced
requirements on computer resources, the
precedence diagram has become more com-
mon in recent years.
Activity-on-Arrow Diagram
"Y 5 "r
!
Activity A has
been "artificially"
broken into two
separate activities.
Activity Description
Activity Duration
#e.g., days)
Precedence Diagram
A Activity Description
]'_ ActivityDuration(e.g.,days)
SS5 B
ThismeansthatActivityB
start5daysaftercab
ActivityA starts.
Note: i
Each activity's
description
shouldcontain
an action and
the object of
that action.
!
Figure 3 Activity-on-Arrow and Precedence
Diagrams for Network Schedules
The precedence diagram format allows
for simple depiction of the following logical
relationships:
• Activity B begins when Activity A begins
(Start-Start, or SS)
• Activity B begins only after Activity A
ends (Finish-Start, or FS)
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• Activity B ends when Activity A ends
(Finish-Finish, or FF).
Each of these three activity relationships
may be modified by attaching a lag ( ÷ or - )
to the relationship, as shown in Figure 3.
It is possible to summarize a number of
low-level activities in a precedence diagram
with a single activity. This is commonly
referred to as hammocking. One takes the
initial low-level activity and attaches a
summary activity to it using the first re-
lationship described above. The summary
activity is then attached to the final low-
level activity using the third relationship
described above. Unless one is hammocking,
the most common relationship used in prece-
dence diagrams is the second one mentioned
above. The activity-on-arrow format can
represent the identical time-precedence logic
as a precedence diagram by creating artifi-
cial events and activities as needed.
Establishing a Network Schedule
Scheduling begins with project-level sched-
ule objectives for delivering the products de-
scribed in the upper levels of the WBS. To
develop network schedules that are consis-
tent with the project's objectives, the follow-
ing six steps are applied to each cost account
at the lowest available level of the WBS.
Step 1: Identify activities and dependen-
cies needed to complete each WBS element.
Enough activities should be identified to
show exact schedule dependencies between
activities and other WBS elements. It is not
uncommon to have about 100 activities iden-
tified for the first year of a WBS element
that will require 10 work-years per year.
Typically, there is more schedule detail for
the current year, and much less detail for
subsequent years. Each year, schedules are
updated with additional detail for the cur-
rent year. This first step is most easily ac-
complished by:
• Ensuring that the cost account WBS is
extended downward to describe all sig-
nificant products, including documents,
reports, hardware and software items.
• For each product, listing the steps re-
quired for its generation and drawing the
process as a work flow diagram.
• Indicating the dependencies among the
products, and any integration and verifi-
cation steps within the work package.
Step 2: Identify and negotiate external
dependencies. External dependencies are
any receivables from outside of the cost ac-
count, and any deliverables that go outside
of the cost account. Informal negotiations
should occur to ensure that there is agree-
ment with respect to the content, format and
labeling of products that move across cost
account boundaries. This step is designed to
ensure that lower level schedules can be
integrated.
Step 3: Estimate durations of all activi-
ties. Assumptions behind these estimates
(work force, availability of facilities, etc.)
should be written down for future reference.
Step 4: Enter the schedule data for the
WBS element into a suitable computer pro-
gram to obtain a network schedule and an
estimate of the critical path for that element.
(There are many commercially available
software packages for this function.) This
step enables the cognizant engineer, team
leader, and/or systems engineer to review
the schedule logic. It is not unusual at this
point for some iteration of steps one to four to
be required in order to obtain a satisfactory
schedule. Reserve will also be added to criti-
cal path activities, often in the form of a
dummy activity, to ensure that schedule
commitments can be met for this WBS ele-
ment.
Step 5: Integrate schedules of lower level
WBS elements, using suitable software, so
that all dependencies between WBS ele-
ments are correctly included in a project
z
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network. It is important to include the im-
pacts of holidays, weekends, etc., at this
point. The critical path for the project is dis-
covered at this step in the process.
Step 6: Review the work force level and
funding profile over time, and make final ad-
justments to logic and durations so that work
force levels and funding levels are reason-
able. Adjustments to the logic and the dura-
tions of activities may be needed to conform
to the schedule targets established at the
project-level. This may include adding more
activities to some WBS element, deleting re-
dundant activities, increasing the work force
for some activities that are on the critical
path, or finding ways to do more activities in
parallel, rather than in series. If necessary,
the project-level targets may need to be ad-
justed, or the scope of the project may need to
be reviewed. Again, it is good practice to
have some schedule reserve, or float, as part
of a risk mitigation strategy.
The product of these last steps is a feasi-
ble baseline schedule for each WBS element
that is consistent with the activities of all
other WBS elements, and the sum of all
these schedules is consistent with both the
technical scope and the schedule goals for the
project. There should be enough float in this
integrated master schedule so that schedule
and associated cost risk are acceptable to the
project and to the project's customer. Even
when this is done, time estimates for many
WBS elements will have been underestimat-
ed, or work on some WBS elements will not
start as early as had been originally as-
sumed due to late arrival of receivables. Con-
sequently, replanning is almost always
needed to meet the project's goals.
Reporting Techniques
Summary data about a schedule is usually
described in Gantt charts, a good example of
which is shown in Figure 4. Another type of
output format is a table that shows the float
and recent changes in float of key activities.
For example, a project manager may wish to
Desirable Features in Gantt Charts
The Gantt chart shown in Figure 4 illustrates
the following desirable features:
• A heading that describes the WBS element,
the responsible manager, the date of the
baseline used, and the date that status was
reported.
• A milestone section in the main body (lines 1
and 2).
• An activity section in the main body.
Activity data:
a. WBS elements (lines 3, 5, 8, 12, 16 and
20)
b. Activities (indented from WBS elements)
c. Current plan (shown as thick bars)
d. Baseline plan (same as current plan, or if
different, represented by thin bars under
the thick bars)
e. Status line at the appropriate date
f. Slack for each activity (dashed lines
above the current plan bars)
g. Schedule slips from the baseline (dashed
lines below the milestone on line 12)
• A note section, where the symbols in the
main body can be explained.
This Gantt chart shows only 23 lines, which is a
summary of the activities currently being
worked for this WBS element. It is appropriate
to tailor the amount of detail to those items most
pertinent at the time of status reporting.
know precisely how much schedule reserve
has been consumed by critical path activi-
ties, and whether reserves are being
consumed or are being preserved in the
latest reporting period. This table provides
information on the rate of change of schedule
reserve.
Good scheduling systems provide
capabilities to show resource requirements
over time, and to make adjustments so that
the schedule is feasible with respect to
resource constraints over time. Resources
may include work force level, funding
profiles, important facilities, etc. Figure 5
shows an example of an unleveled resource
profile. The objective is to move the start
dates of tasks that have float to points where
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Figure 4 An Example of a Gantt Chart
the resource profile is feasible. If that is
not sufficient, then the assumed task dura-
tions for resource-intensive activities should
be re-examined and, accordingly, the re-
source levels changed.
BUDGETING AND RESOURCE PLANNING
Budgeting and resource planning involves
the establishment of a reasonable project
baseline budget and the capability to ana-
lyze changes to that baseline resulting from
technical and/or schedule changes. The proj-
ect's WBS, baseline schedule and budget
should be viewed by the systems engineer as
mutually dependent, reflecting the technical
content, time, and cost of meeting the proj-
ect's goals and objectives.
The budgeting process needs to take into
account whether a fixed cost cap or cost
profile exists. When no such cap or profile
exists, a baseline budget is developed from
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Figure 5 An Example of an Unleveled Resource
Profile
the WBS and network schedule. This specifi-
cally involves combining the project's work
force and other resource needs with the
appropriate work force rates and other finan-
cial and programmatic factors to obtain cost
element estimates. These elements of cost
include:
• Direct labor costs
• Overhead costs
• Other direct costs (travel, data process-
ing, etc.)
• Subcontract costs
• Material costs
• General and administrative costs
• Cost of money (i.e., interest payments,
if applicable)
• Fee (if applicable)
• Contingency
When there is a cost cap or a fixed cost
profile, there are additional logic gates that
must be satisfied before the systems engi-
neer can complete the budgeting and plan-
ning process. A determination needs to be
made whether the WBS and network sched-
ule are feasible with respect to mandated
cost caps and/or cost profiles. If not, the sys-
tems engineer needs to recommend the best
approaches for either stretching out a project
(usually at an increase in the total cost) or
descoping the project's goals and objectives,
requirements, design, and/or implementa-
tion approach.
Whether a cost cap or fixed cost profile
exists, it is important to control costs after
they have been baselined. An important
aspect of cost control is project cost and
schedule status reporting and assessment.
Another is cost and schedule risk planning,
such as developing risk avoidance and work-
around strategies. At the project level,
budgeting and resource planning must also
ensure that an adequate level of contingency
funds are included to deal with unforeseen
events.
Assessing the Effect of Schedule Slippage
Certain elements of cost, called fixed costs, are
mainly time related, while others, called vari-
able costs, are mainly product related. If a pro-
ject's schedule is slipped, then the fixed costs of
completing it increase. The variable costs re-
main the same in total (excluding inflation
adjustments), but are deferred downstream, as
in the figure below.
vARIABLE
FIXED
T NOW
II
DEFERRED
$
To quickly assess the effect of a simple schedule
slippage:
• Convert baseline budget plan from nominal
(real-year) dollars to constant dollars
• Divide baseline budget plan into fixed and
variable costs
• Enter schedule slip implementation
• Compute new variable costs including any
work force disruption costs
• Repeat last two steps until an acceptable
implementation is achieved
• Compute new fixed c_sts
. Sum new fixed and variable costs
• Convert from constant dollars to nominal
(real-years) dollars.
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RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk management comprises purposeful
thought to the sources, magnitude and
mitigation of risk, and actions directed to-
ward its balanced reduction. As such, risk
management is an integral part of project
management, and contributes directly to the
objectives of systems engineering.
Risk
The term risk has different meanings depending
on the context. Sometimes it simply indicates the
degree of variability in the outcome or result of a
particular action. In the context of risk
management during the systems engineering
process, the term denotes a combination of both
the likelihood of various outcomes and their
distinct consequences. The focus, moreover, is
generally on undesired or unfavorable outcomes
such as the risk of a technical failure, or the risk
of exceeding a cost target.
NASA policy objectives with regard to
project risks are expressed in NMI 8070.4A,
Risk Management Policy. These are to:
• Provide a disciplined and documented ap-
proach to risk management throughout
the project cycle
• Support management decision making by
providing integrated risk assessments
(i.e., taking into account cost, schedule,
performance and safety concerns)
• Communicate to NASA management the
significance of assessed risk levels and
the decisions made with respect to them.
There are a number of actions the systems
engineer can take to effect these objectives.
Principal among them is planning and com-
pleting a well-conceived risk management
program. Such a program encompasses
several related activities during the systems
engineering process. The structure of these
activities is shown in Figure 6.
The first is the process of identifying and
characterizing the project's risks. The objec-
tive of this step is to understand what uncer-
tainties the project faces, and which among
them should be given greater attention. This
is accomplished by categorizing (in a consis-
tent manner) uncertainties by the likelihood
of occurrence (e.g., high, medium, or low),
and separately, according to severity of
consequences. This categorization forms the
basis for ranking uncertainties by their rela-
tive riskiness. Uncertainties with both high
likelihood and severely adverse conse-
quences are ranked higher than those
without these characteristics. The primary
methods used in this process are qualitative;
hence, in systems engineering literature,
this step is sometimes called qualitative risk
assessment. The output of this step is a list of
significant risks (by phase) to be given
specific management attention.
In some projects, qualitative methods are
adequate for making risk management
decisions; in others, these methods are not
precise enough to elucidate the magnitude of
the problem, or to allocate scarce risk reduc-
tion resources. Risk analysis is the process of
quantifying both the likelihood of occurrence
and consequences of potential future events
(or "states of nature" in some texts). The
I
IRiskItioo/and Characterization
Risk Management
Risk Analysis
Figure 6 Risk Management Structure
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systems engineer needs to decide whether
risk identification and characterization are
adequate, or whether the increased precision
of risk analysis is needed for some uncertain-
ties. In making that determination, the sys-
tems engineer needs to balance the (usually)
higher cost of risk analysis against the value
of the additional information.
Risk mitigation is the formulation, selec-
tion and execution of strategies designed to
economically reduce risk. Tracking the effec-
tivity of these strategies is also considered
part of risk mitigation. Risk mitigation is
often a challenge because efforts and expen-
ditures to reduce one type of risk may
increase another type. (Some have called this
the systems engineering equivalent of the
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in quan-
tum mechanics). The ability (or necessity) to
trade one type of risk for another means that
the project manager and the systems engi-
neer need to understand the system-wide
effects of various strategies in order to make
a rational allocation of resources.
Several techniques have been developed
for each of these risk management activities.
The principal ones are shown in Table 1. The
systems engineer needs to choose the tech-
niques that best fit the unique requirements
of each project.
A risk management program is needed
throughout the project cycle. In keeping with
the doctrine of successive refinement, its
focus, however, moves from the "big picture"
in the early phases of the project cycle
(Phases A and B) to more specific issues dur-
ing product design and development (Phases
C and D). During pre-operations and oper-
ations (Phases E and F), the focus changes
again. A good risk management program is
always forward-looking. In other words, a
risk management program should address
the project's ongoing risk issues and future
uncertainties. As such, it is a natural part of
concurrent engineering.
Risk management activities for a project
should be documented in a risk management
program plan. That plan, which elaborates
Risk
Identification
and
Characteriza-
tion
Expert
interviews
Independent
assessment
(cost, schedule
and technical)
Risk templates
(e.g., DoD
4245.7-M)
Lessons
learned i]les
from previous
projects
FMECAs/
FMEAs/
Digraphs
Risk Analysis
Decision
analysis
Probabilistic
Risk
Assessment
(PRA)
Probabilistic
network
schedules (e.g.,
PERT)
Probabilistic
cost and
effectiveness
models (e.g.,
Monte Carlo
models)
Risk
Mitigation
and Tracking
Watchlists/
milestones
Contingency
planning
Critical
items/issues
lists
Cost/schedule
control
VeSte ms and
chnical
Performance
Measure
(TPM)
tracking
Table 1 Techniques of Risk Management
on the SEMP and should be updated at each
phase of the project cycle, contains:
• The project's overall risk policy and objec-
tives
• The programmatic aspects of the risk
management activities (i.e., responsibil-
ities, resources, schedules and miles-
tones, etc.)
• A description of the tools and techniques
to be used for risk identification and
characterization, risk analysis, and risk
mitigation
• A description of the role of risk manage-
ment with respect to systems analysis,
baseline change control, formal reviews,
and status reporting and assessment
• Documentation requirements for each
risk management product and action.
The level of risk management activities
should be consistent with the project's
overall risk policy established in conjunction
with its NASA Headquarters program office.
At present, formal guidelines for the
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classification of projects with respect to over-
all risk policy do not exist; such guidelines
exist only for NASA payloads. These are pro-
mulgated in NMI 8010.1A, Classification of
NASA Payloads, Attachment A.
Types of Risks
There are several ways to describe the var-
ious types of risk a project manager/systems
engineer faces. Traditionally, project manag-
ers and systems engineers have attempted to
divide risks into three or four broad categor-
ies namely, cost, schedule, technical, and
sometimes, safety (and/or hazard) risks.
More recently, others have entered the lexi-
con, including the categories of organization-
al, management, acquisition, supportability,
political and programmatic risks. These
newer categories reflect the expanded set of
concerns of project managers and systems
engineers who must operate in the current
NASA environment. Some of these newer
categories also represent supersets of other
categories. For example, the Defense Sys-
tems Management College (DSMC) Systems
Engineering Management Guide wraps
"funding, schedule, contract relations, and
political risks" into the broader category of
programmatic risks. While these terms are
useful in informal discussions, there appears
to be no formal taxonomy free of ambiguities.
One reason, mentioned above, is that often
one type of risk can be exchanged for an-
other. A second reason is that some of these
categories move together, as for example,
cost risk and political risk (e.g., the risk of
project cancellation).
Another way some have categorized risk
is by the degree of mathematical pre-
dictability in its underlying uncertainty.
The distinction has been made between an
uncertainty that has a known probability
distribution, with known or estimated
parameters, and one in which the underlying
probability distribution is either not known,
or its parameters cannot be objectively
quantified.
An example of the first kind of uncertain-
ty occurs in the unpredictability of the
spares upmass requirement for alternative
Space Station Freedom designs. While the
requirement is stochastic in any particular
logistics cycle, the probability distribution
can be estimated for each design from reli-
ability theory and empirical data. Examples
of the second kind of uncertainty occur in
trying to predict whether a Shuttle accident
will make resupp]y of Freedom impossible
for a period of time greater than x months, or
whether life on Mars exists.
Modern subjectivist (also known as
Bayesian) probability theory holds that the
probability of an event is the degree of belief
that a person has that it will occur, given
his/her state of information. As that infor-
mation improves (e.g., through the acquisi-
tion of data or experience), the subjectivist's
estimate of a probability should converge to
that estimated as if the probability distribu-
tion were known. In the examples of the
previous paragraph, the only difference,
then, is the probability estimator's perceived
state of information. Consequently, subjec-
tivists find the distinction between the two
kinds of uncertainty of little or no practical
significance. The implication of the subjec-
tivist's view for risk management is that,
even with little or no data, the systems
engineer's subjective probability estimates
form a valid basis for risk decision making.
Risk Identification and
Characterization Techniques
A variety of techniques is available for risk
identification and characterization. The
thoroughness with which this step is accom-
plished is an important determinant of the
risk management program's success.
Expert Interviews. When properly con-
ducted, expert interviews can be a major
source of insight and information on the pro-
ject's risks in the expert's area of knowledge.
One key to a successful interview is in
F
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identifying an expert who is close enough to
a risk issue to understand it thoroughly, and
at the same time, able (and willing) to step
back and take an objective view of the prob-
abilities and consequences. A second key to
success is advanced preparation on the part
of the interviewer. This means having a list
of risk issues to be covered in the interview,
developing a working knowledge of these
issues as they apply to the project, and devel-
oping methods for capturing the information
acquired during the interview.
Initial interviews may yield only qualita-
tive information, which should be verified in
follow-up rounds. Expert interviews are also
used to solicit quantitative data and infor-
mation for those risk issues that qualitative-
ly rank high. These interviews are often the
major source of inputs to risk analysis
models built using the techniques described
later.
Independent Assessment. This technique
can take several forms. In one form, it can be
a review of project documentation, such as
statements of work, acquisition plans, verifi-
cation plans, manufacturing plans and the
SEMP. In another form, it can be an evalua-
tion of the WBS for completeness and consis-
tency with the project's schedules. In a third
form, an independent assessment can be an
independent cost (and/or schedule) estimate
from an outside agency and/or group.
Risk Templates. This technique consists of
examining and then applying a series of pre-
viously developed risk templates to a current
project. Each template generally covers a
particular risk issue, and then describes
methods for avoiding or reducing that risk.
The most widely recognized series of tem-
plates appears in DoD 4245.7M, Transition
from Development to Production... Solving
the Risk Equation. Many of the risks and risk
responses described are based on lessons
learned from DoD programs, but are general
enough to be useful to NASA projects. As a
general caution, risk templates cannot
provide an exhaustive list of risk issues for
every project, but they are a useful input to
risk identification.
Lessons Learned. A review of the lessons
learned files, data and reports from previous
similar projects can produce insights and in-
formation for risk identification on a new
project. For technical risk identification, as
an example, it makes sense to examine pre-
vious projects of similar function, architec-
ture or technological approach. The lessons
learned from the Infrared Astronomical Sat-
ellite (IRAS) project might be useful to the
Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF)
project, even though the iatter's degree of
complexity is significantly greater. The key
to applying this technique is in recognizing
what aspects are analogous in two projects,
and what data are relevant to the new
project. Even if the the documented lessons
learned from previous projects are not appli-
cable at the system level, there may be
valuable data applicable at the subsystem or
component level.
FMECAs, FMEAs and Digraphs. Failure
Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA), Failure Modes and Effects Analy-
sis (FMEA) and digraphs are specialized
techniques for safety (and/or hazard) risk
identification and characterization. These
techniques focus on the hardware compo-
nents that make up the system. According to
MIL-STD-1629A, FMECA is "an ongoing
procedure by which each potential failure in
a system is analyzed to determine the results
or effects thereof on the system, and to classi-
fy each potential failure mode according to
its severity." Failures are generally classi-
fied into four severity categories:
• Category I - Catastrophic Failure (possi-
ble death or system loss)
• Category II - Critical Failure (possible
major injury or system damage)
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Category III - Major Failure (possible
minor injury or mission effectiveness deg-
radation)
Category IV - Minor Failure (requires
system maintenance, but does not pose a
hazard to personnel or mission effective-
ness).
A complete FMECA also includes an esti-
mate of the probability of each potential fail-
ure. These probabilities are usually based, at
first, on subjective judgment or experience
factors from similar kinds of hardware com-
ponents, but may be refined from reliability
data as the system development progresses.
An FMEA is similar to an FMECA, but typi-
cally excludes the severity classification
category.
Digraph analysis is an aid in determining
fault tolerance, propagation and reliability
in large, interconnected systems. Digraphs
exhibit a network structure and resemble a
schematic diagram. The digraph technique
permits the integration of data from a num-
ber of individual FMECAs/FMEAs, and can
be translated into fault trees, described be-
low, if quantitative probability estimates are
needed.
Risk Analysis Techniques
The tools and techniques of risk analysis rely
heavily on the concept and "laws" (actually,
axioms and theorems) of probability. The
systems engineer needs to be familiar with
these in order to appreciate the full power
and limitations of these techniques. The
products of risk analyses are generally quan-
titative probability and consequence esti-
mates for various outcomes, more detailed
understanding of the dominant risks, and
improved capability for allocating risk re-
duction resources.
Decision Analysis. Decision analysis is one
technique to help the individual decision
maker deal with a complex set of uncertain-
ties. Using the divide-and-conquer approach
common to much of systems engineering, a
complex uncertainty is decomposed into sim-
pler ones, which are then treated separately.
The decomposition continues until it reaches
a level at which either hard information can
be brought to bear, or intuition can function
effectively. The decomposition can be graphi-
cally represented as a decision tree. The
branch points, called nodes, in a decision tree
represent either decision points or chance
events. Endpoints of the tree are the poten-
tial outcomes.
In most applications of decision analysis,
these outcomes are generally assigned dollar
values. From the probabilities assigned at
each chance node, and the dollar value of
each outcome, the distribution of dollar val-
ues (i.e., consequences) can be derived for
each set of decisions. Even large, complex de-
cision trees can be represented in currently
available decision analysis software. This
software can also calculate a variety of risk
measures.
In brief, decision analysis is a technique
that allows:
• A systematic enumeration of uncertain-
ties and encoding of their probabilities
and outcomes
• An explicit characterization of the deci-
sion maker's attitude toward risk, ex-
pressed in terms of his/her risk aversion
• A calculation of the value of "perfect
information," thus setting a normative
upper bound on information-gathering
expenditures
• Sensitivity testing on probability esti-
mates and outcome dollar values.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). A
PRA seeks to measure the risk inherent in a
system's design and operation by quantify-
ing both the likelihood of various possible
accident sequences and their consequences.
A typical PRA application is to determine
the risk associated with a specific nuclear
power plant. Within NASA, PRAs are used
to demonstrate, for example, the relative
E
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An Example of a Decision Tree for Robotic Precursor Missions to Mars
In 1990, the Lunar/Mars Exploration Program Office (LMEPO) at JSC wanted to know how robotic prect_-
sor missions might reduce the risk of a manned Mars mission. Structuring the problem as a decision tree at-
lows the effects of different missions and chance events to be systematically and quantitatively evaluated.
The portion of the decision tree shown here illustrates the calculation of the probabilities for three distinct
outcomes: (A) a successful Mars landing, (B) a safe return without a landing, or (C) a disaster resulting in
mission and crew loss, when no atmospheric or site reconnaissance robotic precursor mission,s were made
and aerocapture at Mars was selected. As new information becomes available, the decision tree s data can be
reviewed and updated.
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= .8635| _ _ Land 0.099.L2._
/_x^ = .0600_"= 1.000 Propulsive'__ -- Catastrophic Crash0.01/ _V A
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Making the same calculations for every branch in the decision tree allows a determination of the best mix of
roboticprecursor missions as an explicit function of: (a) the contribution of each robotic precursor mission to
mannedmission risk reduction; (b) the cost, schedule and riskiness of each robotic mission; (c) the value of
the manned mission; and (d) the science value of each robotic mission in the absence of a subsequent manned
mission. Another benefit of this quantitative approach is that robotic precursors can be traded against other
risk mitigation strategies in the manned mission architecture.
For more information on decision analysis, see de Neufville and Stafford, Systems Analysis for Engineers
and Managers, 1971, and Barclay, et al., Handbook for Decision Analysis, 1977.
safety of launching spacecraft containing
RTGs (Radioisotope Thermoelectric Gener-
ators).
The search for accident sequences is
facilitated by event trees, which depict
initiating events and combinations of system
successes and failures, and fault trees, which
depict ways in which the system failures
represented in an event tree can occur. When
integrated, an event tree and its associated
fault tree(s) can be used to calculate the
probability of each accident sequence. The
structure and mathematics of these trees is
similar to that for decision trees. The
consequences of each accident sequence are
generally measured both in terms of direct
economic losses and in public health effects.
Doing a PRA is itself a major effort,
requiring a number of specialized skills
other than those provided by reliability
engineers and human factors engineers.
PRAs also require large amounts of system
design data at the component level and
operational procedures data. [For additional
information on PRAs, refer to the PRA
Procedures Guide (1983) by the American
Nuclear Society and Institute of Electrical
and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).]
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Probabilistic Risk Assessment Pitfalls
Risk is generally defined in a probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA) as the expected value of a con-
sequence function -- that is:
R = _sPsCs
where Ps istheprobabilityofoutcomes,and Cs is
theconsequenceofoutcomes.To attachprobabil-
itiestooutcomes,eventtreesand faulttreesare
developed.These techniques have been used
since 1953, but by the late1970s,they were
under attackby PRA practitioners.The reasons
includethefollowing:
• Fa,,Ittreesare limitingbecausea complete
set of failures is not definable
• Common cause failures could not be captured
properly. An example of a common cause fail-
ure is one where all the valves in a system
have a defect so that their failures are not
truly independent
• PRA results are sometimes sensitive to sim-
ple changes in event tree assumptions
• Stated criteria for accepting different kinds of
risks are often inconsistent, and therefore not
appropriate for allocating risk reduction re-
sources
• Many risk-related decisions are driven by
perceptions, not necessarily objective risk as
defined by the above equation. Perceptions of
consequences tend to grow faster than the
consequences themselves -- that is, several
small accidents are not perceived as strongly
as o_e large one, even if fatalities are identi-
cal
There are difficulties in dealing with incom-
mensurables, as for example, lives vs. dollars.
Probabilistic Network Schedules. Proba-
bilistic network schedules, such as PERT
(Program Evaluation and Review Tech-
nique), permit the duration of each activity
to be treated as a random variable. By
supplying PERT with the minimum,
maximum and most likely duration for each
activity, a probability distribution can be
computed for project completion time. This
can then be used to determine, for example,
the chances that a project (or any set of tasks
in the network) will be completed by a given
date. In this probabilistic setting, however, a
unique critical path may not exist. Some
practitioners have also cited difficulties in
obtaining meaningful input data for
probabilistic network schedules.
Probabilistic Cost and Effectiveness
Models. These models offer a probabilistic
view of a project's cost and effectiveness out-
comes. This approach explicitly recognizes
that single point values for these variables
do not adequately represent the risk condi-
tions inherent in a project.
Risk Mitigation and Tracking
Techniques
Risk identification and characterization and
risk analysis provide a list of significant
project risks that require further manage-
ment attention and/or action. Because risk
mitigation actions are generally not costless,
the systems engineer, in making recommen-
dations to the project manager, must balance
the cost (in resources and time) of such
actions against their value to the project.
Four responses to a specific risk are usually
available: (1) deliberately do nothing, and
accept the risk, (2) share the risk with a co-
participant, (3) take preventive action to
avoid or reduce the risk, and (4) plan for con-
tingent action.
The first response is to accept a specific
risk consciously. Sometimes, a risk can be
shared with a co-participant, that is, with a
foreign partner or a contractor. In this
situation, the goal is to reduce NASA's risk
independent of what happens to total risk,
which may go up or down. There are many
ways to share risks, particularly cost risks,
with contractors. These include various
incentive contracts and warranties. The
third and fourth responses require that
additional specific planning and actions be
undertaken.
Typical technical risk mitigation actions
include additional (and usually costly)
testing of subsystems and systems, design-
ing in redundancy, and building a full
engineering model. Typical cost risk mitiga-
tion actions include using off-the-shelf
hardware and providing sufficient funding
during Phases A and B. Major supportability
E
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risk mitigation actions include providing
sufficient initial spares to meet the system's
availability goal and a robust resupply
capability (when transportation is a signifi-
cant factor). For those risks that cannot be
mitigated by a design or management
approach, the systems engineer should re-
commend the establishment of reasonable
financial and schedule contingencies and
technical margins.
The strategy and underlying rationale
selected for a specific risk should be docu-
mented in a risk mitigation plan and its ef-
fectivity should be tracked through the pro-
ject cycle, as required by NMI 8070.4A. The
techniques for choosing a (preferred) risk
mitigation strategy deal with the larger role
of trade studies and system modeling in gen-
eral. Some techniques for planning and
tracking are briefly mentioned here.
Watchlists and Milestones. A watchIist is a
compilation of specific risks, their projected
consequences and early indicators of the
start of the problem. The risks on the watch-
list are those that were selected for manage-
ment attention as a result of completed risk
management activities. A typical watchlist
also shows for each specific risk a triggering
event or missed milestone (for example, a
delay in the delivery of long lead items), the
related area of impact (production schedule),
and the risk mitigation strategy to be used in
response. The watchlist is periodically
reevaluated and items are added, modified or
deleted as appropriate. Should the triggering
event occur, the projected consequences
should be updated and the risk mitigation
strategy revised as needed.
Contingency Planning. This technique is
generally used in conjunction with a watch-
list. The focus in contingency planning is on
developing credible hedges and work
arounds, which are activated upon a trigger-
ing event. To be credible, hedges often re-
quire that additional resources be expended,
which provide a return only if the triggering
event occurs. In this sense, contingency
planning and resources act as a form of
project insurance. (The term contingency
here should not be confused with use of the
same term for project reserves.)
Critical Items/Issues Lists. A critical
items/issues list (CIL) is similar to a watch-
list, and has been used extensively on the
Shuttle program to track items with signifi-
cant system safety consequences.
C/SCS and TPM Tracking. Two very
important risk tracking techniques--cost
and schedule control systems (C/SCS) and
Technical Performance Measure (TPM)
tracking--are discussed later.
Risk Management: Summary
Uncertainty is a fact of life in systems engi-
neering. To deal with it effectively, the risk
manager needs a disciplined approach. In a
project setting, a good-practice approach
includes efforts to:
• Plan, document and complete a risk man-
agement program.
• Identify and characterize risks for each
phase of the project. High risks, those for
which the combined effects of likelihood
and consequences are significant, should
be given specific management attention.
Reviews conducted throughout the
project cycle should help to force out risk
issues.
• Apply qualitative and quantitative
techniques to understand the dominant
risks and to improve the allocation of risk
reduction resources. This may include the
development of project-specific risk ana-
lysis models such as decision trees and
PRAs.
• Formulate and execute a strategy to
handle each risk, including establish-
ment, where appropriate, of reasonable
financial and schedule contingencies and
technical margins.
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• Track the effectivity of each risk mitiga-
tion strategy.
Good risk management requires a team
effort--that is, managers and systems engi-
neers at all levels of the project need to be
involved. However, risk management re-
sponsibilities must be assigned to specific
individuals. Successful risk management
practices often evolve into institutional
policy.
BASELINE MANAGEMENT
The baseline for a project contains all of the
technical requirements and related cost and
schedule requirements that are sufficiently
mature to be accepted and placed under
change control by the NASA project man-
ager. The project baseline c?nsists of two
parts: the technical baseline and the
business baseline. The systems engineer is
responsible for managing the technical base-
line and ensuring that the technical baseline
is consistent with the costs and schedules in
the business baseline. Typically, the project
control office manages the business baseline.
Baseline management requires the for-
mal agreement of both the buyer and the
seller to proceed according to the up-to-date,
documented project requirements (as they
exist at that phase in the project cycle), and
to change the baseline requirements only by
a formal change control process. The buyer
might be an external funding agency. For
example, the buyer for the GOES project is
NOAA and the seller is the NASA GOES
project office. Baseline management must be
enforced at all levels, in the next level for
this same example, the NASA GOES project
office is the buyer and the seller is the
contractor, the Loral GOES project office.
The project-level systems engineer is
responsible for ensuring the completeness
and technical integrity of the technical base-
line. The content of the technical baseline
includes:
• Definition (or specification) of the func-
tional and performance requirements for
hardware, software and operations
• Interface definitions
• Specialty engineering requirements
• Verification plans
• Documentation trees.
Baseline management includes the following
techniques:
• Baseline definition and approval
• Configuration control (and version con-
trol, if needed)
• Change control
• Traceability
• Data management
• Baseline communication.
Baseline Evolution
The project baseline evolves in discrete steps
through the project life cycle. An initial
baseline may be established when the top-
level user requirements expressed in the
Mission Needs Statement are placed under
configuration control. At each interphase
control gate, increased technical detail is
added to the maturing baseline. For a typical
project, there are five sequential technical
baselines:
• Functional baseline at Program/Project
Requirements Review (PRR, sometimes
called development baseline)
• Design-to baseline at Preliminary Design
Review (PDR)
• Build-to (or code-to) baseline at the Criti-
cal Design Review (CDR)
• Production (or as-built or as-coded) base-
line at the System Acceptance Review
(SAR)
• Operational (or as-deployed) baseline at
Operational Acceptance Review (OAR).
Risk management activity must begin
early and continue throughout the
|
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decomposition process of the project cycle to
prove that the core-level decisions are sound.
These early detailed studies and tests must
be documented and retained in the project
archives, but they are not part of the techni-
cal baseline.
Configuration Management
Configuration management is the discipline
of identifying and formalizing the physical
and functional characteristics of a configura-
tion item at discrete points in the product
evolution for the purpose of maintaining the
integrity of the product and controlling
changes to the baseline. As a functional
discipline, configuration management man-
ages the documentation of the approved
evolution of a product's configuration. Con-
figuration management includes configura-
tion or baseline identification, configuration
control and configuration communication.
(See Figure 7.)
Configuration management is essential to
the execution of an orderly development
process, to enable the modification of an
existing design, and to provide for later rep-
lication of an existing design. Configuration
management often provides the information
needed to track the technical progress of the
project.
Configuration identification of a baseline
is evidenced by documentation such as
requirements documents, specifications,
drawings, code listings, process specifica-
tions and material specifications. Configura-
tion documentation is not considered part of
the technical baseline until approved by
control gate action of the buyer.
Configuration control is the process of
controlling changes to any approved baseline
by formal action of a change board that is
controlled by the same authority that pre-
viously approved the baseline. Typically, the
change control board meets to consider
change requests to the business or technical
baselines of the project. The project manager
is usually the board chair, and the configura-
tion manager the secretary, who skillfully
guides the process and records the official
events of the process.
In a change control board forum, a num-
ber of issues should be addressed:
. What is the proposed change?
• What is the reason for the change?
. What is the design impact?
• What is the effectiveness or performance
impact?
• What is the schedule impact?
• What is the project life-cycle cost impact?
• What is the impact of not making the
change?
• What is the risk of making the change?
• What is the impact on operations?
• What is the impact to support equipment
and services?
• What is the impact on spares require-
ments?
• What is the effectivity of the change?
• What documentation is affected by the
change?
• Is the buyer supportive of the change?
Configuration
Management
Configuration
Identification
Configuration
Control
Figure 7 Configuration Management Structure
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A review of this information should lead to a
well-informed decision. When this informa-
tion is not available to the change control
board, unfounded decisions are made, often
with negative consequences to the project.
Change Control Board Conduct
Objective: To review evaluations and then ap-
prove or disapprove proposed changes to the pro-
ject's technical, operations or business baseline.
Participants: Project manager (chair), project-
level systems engineer, managers of each affected
organization, configuration manager (secretary),
presenters.
Format: Presenter covers recommended change
and _ -cusses related system impact. The presen-
tath _s reviewed by the systems engineer for
comp:eteness prior to presentation.
Decision: The CCB members discuss the Change
Request (CR) and formulate a decision. Project
manager agrees or overrides.
Configuration control always includes
the management of approved baseline
documentation, so configuration control is
required on a no-change project as well as a
frequently changing one. Configuration
management and configuration control em-
brace the function of data management,
which ensures that only up-to-date baseline
information is available to the project staff.
The data management function also encom-
passes managing and archiving supporting
analyses and trade study data, and keeping
it convenient for project use.
Configuration verification is part of con-
figuration control. It ensures that the result-
ing products conform to the intentions of the
designers and to the standards established
by preceding approved baselines. Each con-
trol gate serves to review and challenge the
data presented for conformance to the pre-
viously established baseline constraints. The
Physical Configuration Audit control gate
verifies that the physical configuration of the
product corresponds to the build-to (or code-
to) documentation previously approved at
the CDR. The Functional Configuration
Audit control gate verifies that the accep-
tance test results are consistent with the test
requirements previously approved at the
PDR and CDR. The Formal Qualification
Review control gate verifies that the as-built
product is consistent with the as-built or as-
coded documentation and describes the ulti-
mate configuration of the product. This
review follows all modifications needed to
implement qualification-caused corrective
actions.
For disciplined software development, ad-
ditional configuration control methods are
recommended:
• Computer Resources Working Group
(CRWG)--ensures the development envi-
ronment is adequate for the job
• Software Configuration Review Board--
change board for software baseline
changes
• Software Development Library--man-
agement controlled repository for soft-
ware development documentation and
tools
• Software Development Folder (SDF)--
developer-controlled repository for devel-
opment documentation and tools.
The configuration manager performs the
following functions:
• Conceives, documents and manages the
configuration management system
• Acts as secretary of the change control
board (controls the change approval
process)
• Controls changes to baseline documenta-
tion
• Controls release of baseline documenta-
tion
• Initiates configuration verification au-
dits.
Configuration communication is the process
of conveying to all involved parties the
approved baseline progression in a timely
manner. This is essential to ensure that
=
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developers only pursue options that are com-
patible with the approved baseline.
Communication also keeps developers
knowledgeable of the approved baseline and
the necessity ofapproaching the change con-
trol board for approval of any deviations
considered necessary to further develop the
system.
The project'sapproach to configuration
management should be documented in the
project'sConfiguration Management Plan.
Change Control and Version Control
Once a baseline is placed under change con-
trol, any change requires the approval of the
change control board. The project manager
chairs the change control board, while the
systems engineer or configuration manager
is responsible for reviewing all material for
completeness before it is presented to the
board, and for ensuring that all affected or-
ganizations are represented in the change
control board forum.
Change control is essential at both the
contractor and NASA Center levels.
Changes determined to be Class 1 to the
contractor must be referred to the NASA
project manager for resolution. This process
is described in Figure 8. The use of a prelimi-
nary Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) to
forewarn of an impending change provides
the project manager with sufficient prelimi-
nary information to determine whether the
contractor should spend NASA contract
funds on a formal ECP. This technique is
designed to save significant contract dollars.
Class 1 changes affect the approved base-
line and hence the product version identifica-
tion. Class 2 changes are editorial changes or
internal changes not "visible" to the external
interfaces.
Overly formalized systems can become so
burdensome that members of the project
team may try to circumvent the process. It is
essential that the formality of the change
process be appropriately tailored to the
needs of each project. However, there must
always be an effective change control process
on every project.
For software projects, it is routine to use
version control for both pre-release and post-
release deliverable systems. It is equally
important to maintain version control for
hardware-only systems.
Approved changes on a development
project that has only one deliverable ob-
viously are only applicable to that one deliv-
erable item. However, for projects that have
multiple deliverables of "identical" design,
changes may become effective on the second
or subsequent production articles. In such a
!
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Figure 8 Contract Change Control Process
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situation, the change control board must
decide the effectivity of the change, and the
configuration control system must maintain
version control and identification of the
as-built configuration for each article. Incre-
mental implementation of changes is
common in projects that have a deliberate
policy of introducing product or process
improvements. As an example, the original
1972 plan held that each of the Space Shuttle
orbiters would be identical. In reality, each
of the orbiters is different, driven primarily
by the desire to achieve the original payload
requirement of 65,000 pounds. Proper
version control documentation has been
essential to the sparing, fielding and main-
tenance of the operational fleet.
Data Management and Requirements
Traceability
Data management is an essential and associ-
ated function to configuration management.
Data management ensures that official
baseline data is retained, available and
controlled for all official project use. Data
management is essentially the official
project library and reference desk.
The data manager performs the following
functions:
• Conceives, documents and manages the
documentation management system
• Manages changes to baseline documenta-
tion
• Manages the release of baseline docu-
mentation
• Manages the project library.
Before the project team can produce a
tangible product, engineering must produce
descriptions of the system using words, icons
(drawings) and numbers (i.e., symbolic in-
formation). The project team must have a
common understanding of the words and
icons in order to be able to go from an idea to
a properly functioning system.
Since the systems engineer spends time
working with information about the system
rather than the system itself, there are
several vital characteristics the symbolic in-
formation must have. First, the information
must be shareable. Whether it is in electron-
ic or paper form, the data must be readily
available in the most recently approved
version to all members of the team.
Second, symbolic information must be
durable. This means that it must be recalled
accurately every time and represent the
most current version of the baseline. The
baseline information cannot change or de-
grade with repeated access of the database or
paper files, and cannot degrade with time.
This is not a trivial requirement, poor data
management practices (e.g., allowing some-
one to borrow the only copy of a document or
drawing) can allow controlled information to
become lost. Also, material must be retained
for the life of the program (and possibly be-
yond), and a complete set of documentation
for each baseline change must be retained.
Third, the symbolic information must be
traceable upward and downward. A data
base must be developed and maintained to
show the parentage of any requirement. The
data base must also be able to display all
children derived from a given requirement.
Finally, traceability must be provided to
engineering reports that document trade
study results and other decisions that played
a key role in the flowdown of requirements.
It is the responsibility of the systems
engineer to ensure the active, approved base-
line is communicated to all those relying on
it. This technique keeps all participants ap-
prised as to the distinction between what is
frozen under formal change control and what
can still be decided without change control
board approval.
REVIEWS, AUDITS AND CONTROL GATES
The intent and policy for reviews, audits and
control gates should be developed during
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Phase A and defined in the Project Imple-
mentation Plan. The specific implementa-
tion of these activities should be consistent
with, though not limited to, the types of
reviews and audits described in this section.
The same tailoring applies to the timing of
reviews, audits and control gates.
The purpose of a review is to furnish the
forum and process to provide NASA manage-
ment and their contractors assurance that
the most satisfactory approach, plan or
design has been selected, that a configura-
tion item has been produced to meet the
specified requirements, or that a configura-
tion item is ready. Reviews (technical or
management) are scheduled to communicate
an approach, demonstrate an ability to meet
requirements or establish status. Reviews
help to develop a better understanding
among task or project participants, open
communication channels, alert participants
and management of problems and open ave-
nues for solutions.
Project Termination
It should be noted that project termination,
while usually disappointing to project personnel,
may be a proper reaction to changes in external
conditions or to an improved understanding of
the system's projected cost-effectiveness.
The purpose of an audit is to provide
NASA management and its contractors a
thorough examination of adherence to pro-
gram or project policies, plans, requirements
and specifications. Audits are the systematic
examination of tangible evidence to deter-
mine adequacy, validity and effectiveness of
the activity or documentation under review.
An audit may examine documentation of
policies and procedures as well as verify
adherence to them.
The purpose of a control gate is to provide
a scheduled event (either a review or an
audit) that NASA management will use to
make program or project go/no-go decisions.
A control gate is a management event in the
project cycle that is of sufficient importance
to be identified, defined and included in the
project schedule. It requires formal examina-
tion to evaluate project status and to obtain
approval to proceed to the next management
event according to the Project Implementa-
tion Plan.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR REVIEWS
Review Boards. The convening authority,
who supervises the manager of the activity
being reviewed, normally appoints the
review board chair. Unless there are compel-
ling technical reasons to the contrary, the
chair should not be directly associated with
the project or task under review. The conven-
ing authority also names the review board
members. The majority of the members
should not be directly associated with the
program or project under review.
Internal Reviews. During the course of a
project or task, it is necessary to conduct
internal reviews that present technical
approaches, trade studies, analyses and
problem areas to a peer group for evaluation
and comment. The timing, participants and
content of these reviews are normally de-
fined by the project manager or the manager
of the performing organization. Internal
reviews are also held prior to participation in
a formal, control gate review.
The internal reviews provide an excellent
means for controlling the technical progress
of the project. They also should be used to en-
sure that all interested parties are involved
in the design/development process early on,
and throughout the process. Thus, represen-
tatives from areas such as manufacturing
and quality assurance should attend the
internal reviews as active participants. They
can then, for example, ensure that the design
is producible and that quality is managed
through the project cycle.
In addition, some organizations utilize a
Red Team. This is an internal, independent,
peer-level review conducted to identify any
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deficiencies in requests for proposals, propos-
al responses, documentation or presentation
material prior to its release. The project or
task manager is responsible for establishing
the Red Team membership and for deciding
which of their recommendations are to be
implemented.
Review Presentation Material. Presenta-
tions using existing documentation such as
specifications, drawings, analyses and re-
ports may be adequate. Copies of any pre-
pared materials (such as viewgraphs) should
be provided to the review board and meeting
attendees. Background information and re-
view presentation material of use to board
members should be distributed to the mem-
bers early enough to enable them to examine
it prior to the review. For major reviews, this
time may be as long as 30 calendar days.
Review Conduct. All reviews should con-
sist of oral presentations of the applicable
project requirements and the approaches,
plans or designs that satisfy those require-
ments. These presentations normally are
given by the cognizant design engineer or
his/her immediate supervisor.
It is highly recommended that in addition
to the review board, the review audience in-
clude project personnel (NASA and contrac-
tor) not directly associated with the design
being reviewed. This is required to utilize
their cross-disciplinary expertise to identify
any design shortfalls or recommend design
improvements. The review audience should
also include non-project specialists in the
area under review, and specialists in manu-
facturing and fabrication, testing, quality
assurance, reliability and safety. Some
reviews may also require the presence of
both the contractor's and NASA's contract-
ing officers.
Prior to and during the review, board
members and review attendees may submit
requests for action or engineering change
requests (ECR) that document a concern,
deficiency or recommended improvement in
the presented approach, plan or design.
Following the review, these are screened by
the review board to consolidate them and to
ensure that the chair and cognizant man-
ager(s) understand the intent of the re-
quests. It is the responsibility of the review
board to ensure that adequate closure
responses for each of the action requests are
obtained.
Post Review Report. The review board
chair has the responsibility to develop,
where necessary, a consensus of the findings
of the board, including an assessment of the
risks associated with problem areas, and de-
velop recommendations for action. The chair
will submit, on a timely basis, a written
report, including recommendations for ac-
tion, to the convening authority with copies
to the cognizant managers.
Standing Review Boards. Standing review
boards are selected for projects or tasks that
have a high level of activity, visibility and/or
resource requirements. Selection of board
members by the convening authority is gen-
erally made from senior Center technical
and management staff. Supporting members
or advisors may be added to the board as
required by circumstances. If the review
board is to function over the lifetime of a pro-
ject, it is advisable to select extra board
members and rotate active assignments to
cover needs.
SPECIFIC TYPES OF REVIEWS
This section describes the types, purpose,
timing and content of most of the reviews
that may occur during the conduct of projects
or tasks. Review material should be keyed to
project documentation when available to
minimize separate efforts.
Program/Project Requirements Review.
Purpose. The Program/Project Require-
ments Review (PRR) establishes the project
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development (i.e., functional) baseline. It
ensures that:
• The project objectives (particularly the
research and/or science objectives) have
been properly translated into definite and
unambiguous statements of require-
ments.
• The impact of these requirements on the
design of the major project elements and
systems is sufficiently well understood
that trades between requirements and
constraints can be properly made.
• The management techniques, procedures,
agreements and resources to be utilized
by all project participants are evaluated.
Timing. At the completion of the Concept
Definition Phase (Phase B) activities, just
prior to issuing the Source Selection Request
for Proposal.
Agenda. The appropriate items from the
following review items/data checklist should
be addressed:
• Status of action items from the Conceptu-
al Design Review (CoDR)
• Project Plan
• Mission objectives
• Research objectives
• Science objectives
• Design criteria and approach
• System trade analyses
• Design analyses and trade studies
• Final system specification
• Preliminary interface specifications
• Software system requirements
• Work breakdown structure
• Preliminary manufacturing plan
• Preliminary ground operations plan
• Preliminary payload integration plan
• Preliminary flight operations plan
• Preliminary data management plan
• Configuration management plan
• Reliability requirements and plan
• Quality assurance requirements and plan
• System safety requirements and plan
• Project policy and requirements
• Management structure
• Budget constraints
• Schedule
• Risk management activities.
Preliminary Design Review. The Prelimi-
nary Design Review (PDR) is not a single re-
view but a number of reviews starting with
the system PDR, followed by reviews con-
ducted on specific configuration items (CIs).
Purpose. The PDR establishes the
design-to baseline and ensures that it meets
the program, project, system, subsystem or
specific CI baseline requirements. The PDR
process should:
• Establish the ability of the selected de-
sign approach to meet the technical
requirements.
• Establish the compatibility of the inter-
face relationships between the specific
configuration item and other interfacing
items.
• Establish the integrity of the selected
design approach.
• Establish the operability of the selected
design.
• Assess compliance with quality assur-
ance, reliability and system safety re-
quirements.
• Address status, schedule and cost rela-
tionships.
• Establish the feasibility of the approach.
Timing. After design-te specifications
are developed and after risk reduction analy-
ses are available.
Agenda. The appropriate items from the
following review items/data checklist should
be addressed:
• Status of action items from the applicable
Hardware or Software Specification
Review(s)
• Final functional requirements and speci-
fications
• Technical justification for the perfor-
mance specified
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• Experiment performance analysis, in-
cluding an analysis of instrument accura-
cy requirements
• Design parameters and constraints
• Environmental design requirements
• Interface design requirements
• Requirements traceability results
• Software standards to be applied
• Design and safety codes and standards to
be applied
• Results of technical feasibility modeling
and testing
• Design optimization analyses
• Discussion ofblock diagrams
• Compliance with functional require-
ments and specifications
• Suitability of inherited designs and hard-
ware
• Lists of preliminary parts, materials and
processes
• Spares requirements philosophy
• Preliminary data management flow and
reduction plans
• Preliminary payload integration plan
• Preliminary ground operations plan
• Preliminary flight operations plan
• Requirements and plans for support
equipment, including ground support
equipment (GSE)
• Preliminary reliability analyses , includ-
ing single-point failure mode policy
• Preliminary system safety analyses
• Quality Assurance Plan
• Hardware and/or software verification
plans
• Hardware and software development
plans and schedules (including verifica-
tion tests or analyses to be performed)
• Present status of item under review, in-
cluding cost and technical developments
• Risk management activities.
Critical Design Review. The Critical De-
sign Review (CDR) is not a single review but
a number of reviews starting with specific
CIs and ending with the system CDR.
Purpose. The CDR verifies the suitabil-
ity of a CI design in meeting the specified
requirements and establishes its build-to
and/or code-to baseline. The CDR determines
whether the design is compatible with the
specified requirements, and verifies that the
design conforms to the requirements estab-
lished at the PDR and updated to the time of
the CDR. During the CDR, the integrity of
the design is verified through review of ana-
lytical and test data.
Following the CDR, the CI specifications
and drawings are updated and placed under
configuration control, and may be then re-
leased for fabrication and/or coding.
Timing. When the design of a CI is com-
plete and after the completion of producibil-
ity demonstration. It should be held early
enough to allow for corrective action and
before total design freeze, the purchase of
significant equipment or fabrication of final
hardware.
Agenda. The appropriate items from the
following review items/data checklist should
be addressed:
• Status of PDR action items
• Design requirements and specifications
• Interface requirements and specifications
• Design approach
• Assessment of hardware and software
inheritance
• Test procedures
• Producibility demonstration results
• Scale model test results
• Design trades and alternatives consid-
ered
• Reliability, maintainability and opera-
bility considerations
• Spares list
• Conformance of the design to functional
and user requirements
• Conformance to environmental design
requirements
• Differences between the configuration
item, system and subsystem perfor-
mances in relation to the performances
estimated at the PDR
• Final hardware and software design ver-
ification plans
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• Detailed mechanical (including electronic
packaging, thermal, hydraulic and pneu-
matic) design
• Detailed electronic and electrical circuit
design
• Detailed software design
• Interface details and agreements
• Mechanical and electronic parts stress
analysis results
• Final reliability analyses, including
single-point failure analyses against the
reliability policy
• System safety analyses
• Electronic parts classifications and
screening specifications
• Nonelectric parts, materials and process-
ing list
• Materials and processing specifications
• Purchased devices list
• Manufacturing and fabrication plans
• Quality assurance plans and procedures
• Configuration control plans
• Qualification and acceptance test plans
• Calibration plan
• Data management flow and data reduc-
tion plan
• Support equipment and GSE require-
ments and plans
• Spares provisioning plan
• Ground operations plan
• Payload integration plan
• Flight operations plan
• Present status of item under review, in-
cluding cost and technical developments
• Risk management activities.
Test Readiness Review. The Test Readi-
ness Review (TRR) is not a single review but
a series of reviews conducted prior to the
start of verification testing of each test arti-
cle, CI, subsystem and/or system.
Purpose. The TRR establishes the deci-
sion point to proceed with planned verifica-
tion (qualification and/or acceptance) testing
of test articles, CIs, subsystems and/or sys-
tems to acquire official sell-off verification
data. The TRR assesses the adequacy of the
test planning and compatibility with the ver-
ification requirements and specifications.
Timing. After completion of preliminary
testing and prior to the start of official verifi-
cation testing.
Agenda. The appropriate items from the
following review items/data checklist should
be addressed:
• Description of test article
• Test objectives
• Verification requirements and specifica-
tions
• Applicable test plans
• Applicable test procedures
• Test configuration and functional block
diagrams
• Test equipment and circuitry
• Test equipment calibration
• Data to be collected, and collection and
preservation methods
• Quality assurance plan
• Safety plan
• Test failure procedures
• Personnel responsibilities and qualifica-
tions
• Present status of item under review in-
cluding cost and technical developments
• Risk management activities.
System Formal Qualification Review.
Purpose. The System Formal Qualifica-
tion Review (SFQR) establishes the system
production baseline by verifying that the
system performance meets the system
qualification specifications. The qualifica-
tion testing demonstrates that the system
meets its performance and operational
requirements within the specified margins.
The SFQR is the decision point for customer
approval of the qualification certification of
the design.
Timing. After the completion of all
lower-level qualification testing.
Agenda. The appropriate items from the
following review items/data checklist should
be addressed:
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• Status of action items from the applicable
CDRs and TRRs
• Description of system tested, including
all subsystems and functional block dia-
grams
• Qualification test objectives
• Qualification test requirements and
specifications
• Description of test facilities
• Description of test configurations
• Subsystem qualification test results
• System qualification test results
• Qualification by similarity analysis
• Nonconformance reports/status
. Waivers and deviations
• Open work list
• Environmental retest following correc-
tive action of any failures
• Strength and fracture mechanics for as-
built hardware
• Software development documentation
• Summary of qualification status of all
end items subjected to separate qualifica-
tion tests
• Operational manuals
• Maintenance manuals
• Present status of system under review,
including cost and technical develop-
ments
• Risk management activities.
Functional and Physical Configuration
Audit.
Purpose. A Functional Configuration
Audit (FCA) verifies that each as-built con-
figuration item, test article, subsystem
and/or system satisfies the functional and
performance requirements specified in their
respective design-to specifications.
A Physical Configuration Audit (PCA)
verifies that each as-built test article, CI,
subsystem and/or system:
Q Satisfies the physical requirements
(weight, center of gravity, moments of in-
ertia, surface finish, cleanliness, etc.)
specified in their respective design speci-
fications
• Is correctly documented in as-built draw-
ings, code listings, user manuals, etc.
Timing. Following the completion of the
SFQR. Usually held in conjunction with the
System Acceptance Review (SAR). For single
unit projects, the FCA/PCA may be held pri-
or to qualification testing.
Agenda. The appropriate items from the
following project documentation should be
addressed:
• CI, subsystem and system specifications
• Design drawings and engineering orders
• Subsystem and system schematics and
block diagrams
• Design verification matrices for each con-
figuration item, subsystem and system
• Inspection results
• Material and electronic parts certifica-
tions
• Materials process certifications
• MaterialUtilization List (MUL)
• Installed non-flight hardware list
• Test results
• Demonstration results
• Nonconformance reports/status
• Results of each Configuration Item Ac-
ceptance Review (CIAR)
• Results of the SFQR.
System Acceptance Review.
Purpose. The System Acceptance Review
(SAR) provides the decision point to confirm
that the design is ready for either integra-
tion, acceptance or replication.
Timing. Following the completion of
the SFQR and prior to the Multi-Unit
Procurement Phase and/or the Pre-
Operations Phase (Phase E).
Agenda. The appropriate items from the
following project documentation should be
addressed:
• Briefdescriptionofsystem under review
• Verification requirements
• Results of the system FCA and PCA
• Results of the SFQR
!
!
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• System verification report (qualification
and operation)
• System acceptance report
• Final systems operations and mainten-
ance methods
• System development lessons learned
document
• Safety analyses status
• Present status of system under review,
including cost and technical develop-
ments
• Risk management activities.
Safety Reviews. System safety is the appli-
cation of engineering and management prin-
ciples, criteria and techniques to optimize
safety within the constraints of operational
effectiveness, time and cost through all
phases of the project cycle. A series of system
and occupational safety reviews are held
during the project cycle, many of which are
held concurrently with other project reviews.
Following are descriptions of these reviews
and their relationship to the other project
reviews.
Occupational Safety Reviews. The re-
quirements for these reviews are not covered
here. However, the systems engineer should
be aware that many occupational safety re-
quirements can impose requirements on
flight and/or ground equipment, such as the
shipping and handling of pressure vessels or
toxic or explosive materials. Early reviews
with Center occupational safety personnel
should be held to identify and understand
any problem areas and specify the require-
ments to control them.
Conceptual Design Safety Review.
Purpose. The Conceptual Design Safety
Review (CoDSR) ensures that safety require-
ments have been included in the conceptual
design and that a preliminary assessment of
the potential hazards has been made. At
several NASA Centers, the CoDSR is called
the Phase 0 Safety Review.
Timing. At the completion of the Mission
Needs and Conceptual Studies Phase (Phase
A). It should be held concurrently with the
Conceptual Design Review (CoDR).
Agenda. The appropriate items from the
following list should be addressed:
• Purpose of the project, facility or equip-
ment
• Design requirements
• Safety requirements
• Preliminary project safety plan
• Preliminary hazard analysis
• Safety staffing and management struc-
ture
• Safety budget
• Schedule
• Risk management activities.
Project Requirements Safety Review.
Purpose. The Project Requirements
Safety Review (PRSR) establishes the project
safety requirements baseline and ensures
that:
• The project safety objectives have been
properly translated into definite and un-
ambiguous statements of requirements.
• The impact of these requirements on the
design of the major project elements and
systems is sufficiently well understood
that trades between requirements and
constraints can be properly made.
• The management techniques, procedures,
agreements and resources to implement
the safety program by all project partici-
pants are evaluated.
Timing. At the completion of the Concept
Definition Phase (Phase B) activities just
prior to issuing the Source Selection Request
for Proposal. It should be held concurrently
with the PRR.
Agenda. The appropriate subjects from
the following list should be addressed:
• Purpose of the project, facility or equip-
ment
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• Status of action items from the CoDSR
• Design requirements
• Safety requirements
• Updated preliminary project safety plan
• Updated preliminary hazard analysis
• Safety staffing and management struc-
ture
• Safety budget
• Schedule
• Risk management activities.
Preliminary Design Safety Review. The
Preliminary Design Safety Review (PDSR) is
not a single review but a series of reviews
conducted on specific configuration items,
subsystems and the system.
Purpose. The PDSR ensures that the
proposed CI, subsystem and/or system de-
signs satisfy the project and Center safety re-
quirements. At several NASA Centers, the
PDSR is called the Phase I Safety Review.
Timing. At the completion of prelimi-
nary design and prior to the start of major
detail design activities. It should be held con-
currently with the PDRs.
Agenda. The appropriate subjects from
the following list should be addressed:
• Description of design under review
• Status of safety-related action items from
applicable hardware or software specifi-
cation reviews
• Updated project safety plan
• Updated safety analysis reports
• Updated preliminary hazard analyses
(sometimes called the Phase I Hazard
Analyses)
• Preliminary Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA)
• Preliminary Critical Items List (CIL).
• List of limited-life items
• Accident or mishap investigation reports
• Waiver and deviation request disposi-
tions
• Present status of safety activities, includ-
ing cost and technical developments
• Risk management activities.
Critical Design Safety Review. The Criti-
cal Design Safety Review (CDSR) is not a
single review but a series of reviews conduct-
ed on specific configuration items, subsys-
tems and the system.
Purpose. The CDSR establishes the
baseline for safety requirements, safety haz-
ard controls and verification methods to be
implemented in verifying those controls. At
several NASA Centers, the CDSR is called
the Phase II Safety Review.
Timing. When the design of a configura-
tion item is essentially complete and prior to
total design freeze, the purchase of signifi-
cant equipment, or fabrication of final hard-
ware. It should be held concurrently with the
CDRs,
Agenda. The appropriate subjects from
the following list should be addressed:
• Description of design under review
• Status of safety-related action items from
applicable hardware or software PDSRs
• Final project safety plan
• Updated safety analysis reports
• Updated preliminary hazard analyses
(sometimes called the Phase II Hazard
Analyses)
• Final Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
• FinalCritical Items List
• List oflimited-life items
• Accident or mishap investigation reports
• Waiver and deviation request disposi-
tions
• Present status of safety activities includ-
ing cost and technical developments
• Risk management activities.
System Acceptance Safety Review.
Purpose. The System Acceptance Safety
Review (SASR) provides the decision point to
confirm that all project safety requirements
have been satisfied and confirms the satis-
factory completion of all hazard control
verification items and open safety items. At
several NASA Centers, the SASR is called
the Phase III Safety Review.
F
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Timing. Following the completion of the
SFQR and prior to the Multi-Unit Procure-
ment Phase and the Pre-Operation Phase
(Phase E). It should be held concurrently
with the SAR.
Agenda. The appropriate subjects from
the following list should be addressed:
• Description ofdesignunder review
• Status of safety-related action items from
applicable hardware or software CDRs
• Updated safety analysis reports
• Updated preliminary hazard analyses
(sometimes called the Phase III Hazard
Analyses)
• Accident or mishap investigation reports
• Waiver and deviation request disposi-
tions
• Present status of safety activities, includ-
ing cost and technical developments
• Risk management activities.
Launch or Operational Safety Readiness
Reviews.
Purpose. These reviews ensure the flight
and/or ground operational safety of the item
under review by certifying that:
• A CI, subsystem or system complies with
all program and/or project safety require-
ments.
• Approved controls for all identified safety
hazards have been implemented.
• All personnel involved in the handling
and/or operation of the item under review
have received the required training.
Timing. Following installation and inte-
gration and prior to flight and/or start of
ground operations.
Agenda. The appropriate subjects from
the following list should be addressed:
• Brief description of item under review
• Safety requirements and specifications
• Safety compliance data package
• Hazard analyses/reports with supporting
data
• Critical items list
• Limited-life item list
• Accident or mishap investigation reports
• Nonconformance reports/status
• Personnel training requirements
• Personnel training status
• Present status of safety activities, includ-
ing cost and technical developments
• Risk management activities.
STATUS REPORTING AND ASSESSMENT
An important part of systems engineering
planning is determining what is needed in
time, resources and people to realize the
system that meets the desired goals and
objectives. Planning functions such as WBS
preparation, scheduling and fiscal resource
requirements planning, were discussed earli-
er. Project management, however, does not
end with planning; project managers need
visibility into the progress of those plans in
order to exercise proper management con-
trol. This is the purpose of the status report-
ing and assessing processes. Status reporting
is the process of determining where the
project stands in dimensions of interest such
as cost, schedule and technical performance.
Assessing is the analytical process that con-
verts the output of the reporting process into
a more useful form for the project manager;
namely, what are the future implications of
current trends? Lastly, the manager must
decide whether that future is acceptable, and
what changes, if any, in current plans are
needed. Planning, status reporting, and
assessing are systems engineering and/or
program control functions; decision making
is a management one.
These processes together form the feed-
back loop depicted in Figure 9. This loop
takes place on a continual basis throughout
the project cycle.
This loop is applicable at each level of the
project hierarchy. Planning data, status re-
porting data and assessments flow up the
hierarchy with appropriate aggregation at
each level; decisions cause actions to be
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Figure 9 Planning and Status Reporting
Feedback Loop
taken down the hierarchy. Managers at each
level determine (consistent with policies
establi=.hed at the next higher level of the
project hierarchy) how often, and in what
form, reporting data and assessments should
be made. In establishing these status report-
ing and assessment requirements, some
principles of good practice are:
• Use an agreed-upon set of well-defined
status reporting variables
• Report these core variables in a consis-
tent format at all project levels
• Maintain historical data for both trend
identification and cross-project analyses
• Encourage a logical process of rolling up
status reporting variables, (e.g., use the
WBS for obligations/costs status report-
ing and PBS for mass status reporting)
• Support assessments with quantitative
risk measures
• Summarize the condition of the project by
using color-coded (red, yellow, and green)
alert zones for all core reporting vari-
ables.
Regular, periodic (e.g., monthly) tracking of
the core status reporting variables is recom-
mended, through some status reporting vari-
ables should be tracked more often when
there is rapid change or cause for concern.
Key reviews, such as PDRs and CDRs, are
points at which status reporting measures
and their trends should be carefully scru-
tinized for early warning signs of potential
problems. Should there be indications that
existing trends, if allowed to continue, will
yield an unfavorable outcome, replanning
should begin as soon as practical.
This section provides additional infor-
mation on status reporting and assessment
techniques for costs and schedules, technical
performance, and systems engineering pro-
cess metrics.
Cost and Schedule Control Measures
Status reporting and assessment on costs
and schedules provides the project manager
and systems engineer visibility into how
well the project is tracking against its
planned cost and schedule targets. From a
management point of view, achieving these
targets is on a par with meeting the techni-
cal performance requirements of the system.
It is useful to think of cost and schedule
status reporting and assessment as measur-
ing the performance of the "system that
produces the system."
NHB 9501.2B, Procedures for Contractor
Reporting of Correlated Cost and Perfor-
mance Data, provides specific requirements
for cost and schedule status reporting and
assessment based on a project's dollar value
and period of performance. Generally, the
NASA Form 533 series of reports is applica-
ble to NASA cost-type (i.e., cost reimburse-
ment and fixed-price incentive) contracts.
However, on larger contracts (>$25M)
which require Form 533P, NHB 9501.2B al-
lows contractors to use their own reporting
systems in lieu of 533P reporting. The pro-
ject manager/systems engineer may choose
to evaluate the completeness and quality of
these reporting systems against criteria
established by the project manager/systems
engineer's own Center, or against the DoD's
Cost Schedule Cost System Criteria
(C/SCSC). The latter are widely accepted by
industry and government, and a variety of
tools exist for their implementation.
Assessment Methods. The traditional
method of cost and schedule control is by
comparing baselined cost and schedule plans
against their actual values. In program con-
trol terminology, a difference between actual
k
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performance and planned costs or schedule
status is called a variance.
Figure 10 illustrates two kinds of vari-
ances and some related concepts. A properly
constructed work breakdown structure
(WBS) divides the project work into discrete
tasks and products. Associated with each
task and product (at any level in the WBS) is
a schedule and a budgeted (i.e., planned)
cost. The Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled
(BCWSt) for any set of WBS elements is the
budgeted cost of all work on tasks and pro-
ducts in those elements scheduled to be com-
pleted by time t. The Budgeted Cost of Work
Performed (BCWPt) is a statistic represent-
ing actual performance. BCWPt, also called
Earned Value (EVt), is the budgeted cost for
tasks and products that have actually been
produced (completed or in progress) at time t
in the schedule for those WBS elements. The
difference, BCWPt-BCWSt, is called the
schedule variance at time t.
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The Actual Cost of Work Performed
(ACWPt) is a third statistic representing the
funds that have been expended up to time t
on those WBS elements. The difference be-
tween the budgeted and actual costs,
BCWPt-ACWPt, is called the cost variance
at time t. Such variances may indicate that
the cost Estimate at Completion (EACt) of the
project is different from the budgeted cost.
These types of variances enable a program
analyst to estimate the EAC at any point in
the project cycle.
ffthe cost and schedule baselines and the
technical scope of the work are not fully inte-
grated, then cost and schedule variances can
still be calculated, but the incomplete link-
age between cost data and schedule data
makes it very difficult (or impossible) to esti-
mate the current cost EAC of the project.
Control of Variances and the Role of the
Systems Engineer. When negative vari-
ances are large enough to represent a signifi-
cant erosion of reserves, then management
attention is needed to either correct the vari-
ance, or to replan the project. It is important
to establish levels of variance at which
action is to be taken. These levels are gener-
ally lower when cost and schedule baselines
do not support Earned Value calculations.
The first action taken to control an
excessive negative variance is to have the
cognizant manager or systems engineer in-
vestigate the problem, determine its cause
and recommend a solution. There are a
number of possible reasons why variance
problems occur:
, A receivable was late or was unsatisfac-
tory for some reason.
• A task is technically very difficult and
requires more resources than originally
planned.
• Unforeseeable (and unlikely to repeat)
events occurred, such as illness, a labor
strike, a fire or some other calamity.
Although the identification of variances is
largely a program control function, there is
an important systems engineering role in
their control. That role arises because the
correct assessment of why a negative vari-
ance is occurring greatly increases the
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chances of successful control actions. This
assessment often requires an understanding
of the cost, schedule and technical situation
that can only be provided by the systems
engineer.
Computing the Estimate at Completion
EAC can be estimated at any point in the project.
The appropriate formula depends upon the the
reasons associated for any variances that may
exist. If a variance exists due to a one-time
event, such as an accident, then EAC = BUD-
GET + ACEP - BCWP where BUDGET is the
original planned cost at completion. If a variance
exists for systemic reasons, such as a general un-
derestimate of schedule durations, or a steady
redefinition of requirements, then the variance
is assumed to continue to grow over time, and
the equation is: EAC = BUDGET X (ACWP/
BCWP).
It is also possible that EAC will grow at a
greater rate than estimated by the above equa-
tion if there are a growing number of liens, ac-
tion items or significant problems that will
increase the difficulty of future work. Such fac-
tors could be addressed using risk management
methods.
In a large project, a good EAC is the result of
a variance analysis that may use a combination
of these estimation methods on different parts of
the WBS. A rote formula should not be used as a
substitute for understanding the underlying
causes of variances.
Technical Performance Measures
Status reporting and assessment of the
system's technical performance measures
(TPMs) complements cost and schedule con-
trol. By tracking the system's TPMs, the
project manager gains visibility into wheth-
er the delivered system will actually meet its
performance specifications (requirements).
Beyond that, tracking TPMs ties together a
number of basic systems engineering
activitiesmthat is, a TPM tracking program
forges a relationship among systems analy-
sis, functional and performance require-
ments definition and verification and valida-
tion activities.
• Systems analysis activities identify the
key performance or technical attributes
that determine system effectiveness;
trade studies performed in systems ana-
lysis help quantify the system's perfor-
mance requirements.
• Functional and performance require-
ments definition activities help identify
verification and validation requirements.
• Verification and validation activities re-
sult in quantitative evaluation of TPMs.
• Out-of-bounds" TPMs are signals to re-
plan fiscal, schedule and people re-
sources; sometimes new systems analysis
activities need to be initiated.
Tracking TPMs can begin as soon as a base-
line design has been established, which can
occur as early as Phase B. A TPM tracking
program should begin not later than the
start of Phase C. Data to support the full set
of selected TPMs may, however, not be avail-
able until later in the project cycle.
Selecting TPMs. In general, TPMs can be
generic (attributes that are meaningful to
each Product Breakdown Structure [PBS]
element, like mass or reliability) or unique
(attributes that are meaningful only to spe-
cific PBS elements). The systems engineer
needs to decide which generic and unique
TPMs are worth tracking at each level of the
PBS. The systems engineer should track the
measure of system effectiveness (when the
project maintains such a measure) and the
principal performance or technical attri-
butes that determine it, as top-level TPMs.
At lower levels of the PBS, TPMs worth
tracking can be identified through the func-
tional and performance requirements levied
on each individual system, segment, etc.
In selecting TPMs, the systems engineer
should focus on those that can be objectively
measured during the project cycle. This mea-
surement can be done directly by testing or
indirectly by a combination of testing and
analysis. Analyses are often the only means
available to determine some high-level
=
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TPMs such as system reliability, but the
data used in such analyses should be based
on demonstrated values to the maximum
practical extent. These analyses can be
performed using the same measurement
methods or models used during trade stud-
ies. In TPM tracking, however, instead of
using estimated (or desired) performance or
technical attributes, the models are exer-
cised using demonstrated values. As the
project cycle proceeds through Phases C and
D, the measurement of TPMs should become
increasingly more accurate because of the
availability of more "actual" data about the
system.
Lastly, the systems engineer should se-
lect those TPMs that must fall within well-
defined (quantitative) limits for reasons of
system effectiveness or mission feasibility.
Usually these limits represent either a firm
upper or lower bound constraint. A typical
example of such a TPM for a spacecraft is its
injected mass, which must not exceed the ca-
pability of the selected launch vehicle.
Tracking injected mass as a high-level TPM
is meant to ensure that this does not happen.
Assessment Methods. The traditional
method of assessing a TPM is by establishing
a time-phased planned profile for it, and
comparing the demonstrated value against
that profile. The planned profile represents a
nominal "trajectory" for that TPM taking
into account a number of factors. These
factors include the technological maturity of
the system, the planned schedule of tests and
demonstrations, and any historical exper-
ience with similar or related systems. As an
example, spacecraft dry mass tends to grow
during Phases C and D by as much as 25 to
30 percent. A planned profile for spacecraft
dry mass may try to compensate for this
growth with a lower initial value. The final
value in the planned profile usually either
intersects or is asymptotic to an allocated
requirement (or contract specification). The
planned profile method is the technical per-
formance measurement counterpart to the
Earned Value method for cost and schedule
control described earlier.
Examples of High-Level TPMs for
Planetary Spacecraft and Launch Vehicles
High-level technical performance measures
(TPMs) for planetary spacecraft include:
• End-of-mission (EOM) dry mass
• Injected mass (includes EOM dry mass, base-
line mission plus reserve propellant, other
consumables and upper stage adaptor mass)
• Consumables at EOM
• Power demand (relative to supply)
• Onboard data processing memory demand
• Onboard data processing throughput time
• Onboard data bus capacity
• Total pointing error
Mass and power demands by spacecraft subsys-
tems and science instruments may be tracked
separately as well.
For launch vehicles, high-level TPMs include:
• Total vehicle mass at launch
• Payload mass (at nominal altitude or orbit)
• Payload volume
• Injection accuracy
• Launch reliability
• In-flight reliability
• For reusable vehicles, percent of value recov-
ered
• For expendable vehicles, unit production cost
at the n th unit.
A closely related method of assessing a
TPM relies on establishing a time-phased
margin requirement for it and comparing
the actual margin against that requirement.
The margin is generally defined as the differ-
ence between a TPM's demonstrated value
and its allocated requirement. The margin
requirement may be expressed as a percent
of the allocated requirement. The margin
requirement generally declines through
Phases C and D, reaching or approaching
zero at their completion.
Depending on which method is chosen,
the systems engineer's role is to propose
reasonable planned profiles or margin re-
quirements for approval by the cognizant
manager. The value of either of these meth-
ods is that they allow management by
exceptionnthat is, only deviations from
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planned profiles or margins below require-
ments signal potential future problems re-
quiring replanning. If this occurs, then new
cost, schedule and/or technical changes
should be proposed. Technical changes may
imply some new planned profiles. This is il-
lustrated for a hypothetical TPM in Figure
l l(a). In this example, a significant demon-
strated variance (i.e., unanticipated growth)
in the TPM during design and development
of the system resulted in replanning at time
t. The replanning took the form of an in-
crease in the allowed final value of the TPM
(the "allocation"). A new planned profile was
then established to track the TPM over the
remaining time of the TPM tracking
program.
The margin management method of as-
sessing is illustrated for the same example in
Figure ll(b). The replanning at time t oc-
curred when the TPM fell significantly below
the margin requirement. The new higher
allocation for the TPM resulted in a higher
margin requirement, but it also immediately
placed the margin in excess of that require-
ment.
Both of these methods recognize that the
final value of the TPM being tracked is un-
certain throughout most of Phases C and D.
The margin management method attempts
to deal with this implicitly by establishing a
margin requirement that reduces the
chances of the final value exceeding its allo-
cation to a low number, for example, five per-
cent or less. A third method of reporting and
assessing deals with this risk explicitly. The
risk management method is illustrated for
the same example in Figure ll(c). The
replanning at time t occurred when the
probability of the final TPM value being less
than the allocation fell precipitously into the
red alert zone. The new higher allocation for
the TPM resulted in a substantial improve-
ment in that probability.
The risk management method requires
an estimate of the probability distribution
for the final TPM value. Early in the TPM
tracking program, when the demonstrated
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A n Example of the Rish Management Method for
Traching Spacecraft Mass
DuringPhasesC and D, a spacecraft'sinjectedmass
canbe consideredan uncertainquantity.Estimates
ofeachsubsystem'sand eachinstrument'smass are,
however,made periodicallyb thedesignengineers.
These estimateschange and become more accurate
as actualparts and components are built and
integratedintosubsystems and instrumentsand
are integratedintospacecraft.Injectedmass can
alsochangeduringPhasesC and D asthe quantity
of propellantisfine-tunedto meet the mission
design requirements. At each point during
developmentthen,the spacecraft'sinjectedmass is
betterrepresentedas a probabilitydistribution
ratherthanasasinglepoint.
The mechanics of obtaining a probability
distributionfor injectedmass typicallyinvolve
making estimatesofthreepoints-- the lowerand
upper bounds and the most likelyinjectedmass I
value.These three values can be combined into
parametersthat completelydefinea probability!
distribution like the one shown in the figure below.
Probabi]_
°-'l ..... ....'::.....
SpacecraftInjectedMass,Kg
The launch vehicle's"guaranteed" payload
capability,designatedthe "LV Specification,"is
shown as a boldverticaline.The area under the
probabilitycurvetotheleftofthe boldverticaline
irepresentsthe probabilitythat the spacecraft's
injectedmass willbe lessthan or equal to the
:launchvehicle'spayloadcapability.Ifinjectedmass
isa TPM beingtrackedusingtheriskmanagement
method, thisprobabilitycould be plotted in a
displaysimilartoFigure11(c).
Ifthisprobabilitywere nearly one, then the
projectmanager might consider adding more
objectivestothe missioninordertotakeadvantage
ofthe "largemargin" thatappearsto exist.In the
above figure, however, the probability is
significantlyless than one. Here, the project
manager might considerdescopingthe project,for
example,by removing an instrumentor otherwise
changing missionobjectives.The projectmanager
couldalsosolvethe problemby requestinga larger
launchvehicle!
value is based on indirect means of estima-
tion, this distribution typically has a larger
statistical variance than later, when it is
based on measured data, e.g., a test result.
When a TPM stays along its planned profile
(or equivalently, when its margin remains
above the corresponding margin require-
ment), the narrowing of the statistical distri-
bution should allow the TPM to remain in
the green alert zone (in Figure 1 l(c)) despite
its growth. The three methods represent
different ways to assess TPMs and communi-
cate that information to management, but
whichever is chosen, the pattern of success or
failure should be the same for all three.
Relationship of TPM Tracking Program
to the SEMP. The SEMP is the usual docu-
ment for describing the project's TPM track-
ing program. This description should include
a master list of those TPMs to be tracked and
the measurement and assessment methods
to be employed. If analytical methods and
models are used to measure certain high-
level TPMs, then these need to be identified.
The reporting frequency and timing of as-
sessments should be specified as well. In de-
termining these, the systems engineer must
balance the project's needs for accurate,
timely and effective TPM tracking against
the cost of the TPM tracking program. The
TPM tracking program plan, which elabo-
rates on the SEMP, should specify each
TPM's allocation, time-phased planned pro-
file or margin requirement, and alert zones,
as appropriate to the selected assessment
method.
Systems Engineering Process Metrics
Status reporting and assessment of systems
engineering process metrics provides addi-
tional visibilityinto the performance of the
"system that produces the system." As such,
these metrics supplement the cost and sched-
ule control measures discussed earlier.
Systems engineering process metrics try
to quantify the effectivityand productivity of
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the systems engineering process and organi-
zation. Within a single project, tracking
these metrics allows the systems engineer to
better understand the health and progress of
that project. Across projects (and over time),
the tracking of systems engineering process
metrics allows for better estimation of the
cost and time of performing systems engi-
neering functions. It also allows the systems
engineering organization to demonstrate its
commitment to the TQM principle of con-
tinuous improvement.
Selecting Systems Engineering Process
Metrics
Generally, systems engineering process
metrics fall into three categories: those that
measure the progress of the systems engi-
neering effort, those that measure the qual-
ity of that process, and those that measure
its productivity. Different levels of systems
engineering management are generally
interested in different metrics. For example,
a project manager or lead systems engineer
may focus on metrics dealing with systems
engineering staffing, project risk manage-
ment progress and major trade study
progress. A subsystem systems engineer
may focus on subsystem requirements and
interface definition progress and verification
procedures progress. It is useful for each
systems engineer to focus on just a few
process metrics. Which metrics should be
tracked depends on the systems engineer's
role in the total systems engineering effort.
The systems engineering process metrics
worth tracking also change as the project
moves through the project cycle.
Collecting and maintaining data on the
systems engineering process is not without
cost. Status reporting and assessment of sys-
tems engineering process metrics divert time
and effort from the process itself. The system
engineer must balance the value of each
systems engineering process metric against
its collection cost. The value of these metrics
arises from the insights they provide into the
process that cannot be obtained from cost
and schedule control measures alone. Over
time, these metrics can also be a source of
hard productivity data, which are invaluable
in demonstrating the potential returns from
investment in systems engineering tools and
training.
Examples and Assessment Methods.
Table 2 lists some systems engineering pro-
cess metrics to be considered. That list is not
Function
Requirements
development and
management
Design and
development
Verification and
Validation (V&V)
Reviews
Systems Engineering Cate-
Process Metric gory
Requirements identifiedvs. S
completed vs. approved
!Requirements volatility Q
Trade studies planned vs. S
completed
Requirements approved per p
systems engineering hour
Specificationsplanned vs. S
completed
Processing ofECRs/ECOs Q
Engineering drawings planned S
vs.related
V&V plans identifiedvs. S
approved
V&V procedures planned vs. S
completed
Functional requirements S
approved vs. verified
V&V plans approved per P
systems engineering hour
V&V procedures completed per P
systems engineering hour
Processing oftrouble reports Q
Processing ofReview Item Q
Discrepancies (RIDs)
Processing of action items Q
S = Progress, orschedule-related
Q = Quality.related
P = Productivity
Table2 SystemsEngineeringProcessMetrics
intended to be exhaustive. Because some of
these metrics allow for different interpreta-
tions, each NASA Center needs to define
them in a common-sense way that fits its
own processes. For example, each Center
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needs to determine what it meant by a
completed versus an approved requirement,
or whether these terms are even relevant. As
part of this definition, it is important to
recognize that not all requirements, for
example, need be lumped together. It may be
more useful to track the same metric sepa-
rately for each of several different types of
requirements, for example.
Quality-related metrics should serve to
indicate when a part of the systems engi-
neering process is overloaded and/or break-
ing down. These metrics can be defined and
tracked in several different ways. For
example, requirements volatility can be
quantified as the number of newly identified
requirements, or as the number of changes to
already-approved requirements. As another
example, engineering change request (ECR)
processing could be tracked by comparing
cumulative ECRs opened versus cumulative
ECRs closed, or by plotting the age profile of
of open ECRs, or by examining the number of
ECRs opened last month versus the total
number open. The systems engineer should
apply personal judgment in picking the
status reporting and assessment method.
Productivity-related metrics provide an
indication of systems engineering output per
unit of input. Although more sophisticated
measures of input exist, the most common is
the number of systems engineering hours
dedicated to a particular function or activity.
Because not all systems engineering hours
cost the same, an appropriate weighing
scheme should be developed to ensure
comparability of hours across systems engi-
neering personnel.
Displaying schedule-related metrics can
be accomplished in a table or graph of
planned quantities vs. actuals. With quality-
and productivity-related metrics, trends are
generally more important than isolated
snapshots. The most useful kind of assess-
ment method allows comparisons of the
trend on a current project with that for a
successful completed project of the same
type. The latter provides a benchmark
against which the system engineer can judge
personal efforts.
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